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ABSTRACT 
The U.S. Navy faces challenges as it moves toward automating the maritime 
battlespace and risks falling behind its rising great power competitor, the People’s 
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). How are the U.S. Navy and the PLAN adopting 
automation to improve naval intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)? 
Results of this study indicate that the U.S. Navy is an innovator and early adopter, while 
the PLAN has embraced automated systems and artificial intelligence (AI) as a late 
modernizer, benefiting from knowledge of already relevant technologies. The U.S. 
Navy’s Aegis and Ship Self Defense System and AI technologies enable maritime 
superiority; however, the PLAN is advancing in AI technologies faster than the U.S. 
Navy. This thesis compares the two navies in their adoption of automation and AI 
technologies for ISR. For purposes of this study, automation is defined as a process or 
specific, task-oriented system that operates without immediate human control. AI goes 
deeper and includes advances aimed at creating machines able to analyze, evaluate and 
optimize alternatives in pursuit of broader aims. I employ Everett Rogers’ S-Curve model 
of the diffusion process as a framework for analyzing efforts to increase efficiency of 
naval planners and decision makers as they ponder which automated and AI technologies 
to adopt and how best to utilize them. 
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Automation and the development of artificial intelligence (AI) will influence future 
sea power. On July 8, 2017, President Xi Jinping and China’s State Council stated their 
goal to build a domestic AI industry and to make the country an “innovation center for AI” 
by 2030.1 On February 11, 2019, President Donald Trump signed Executive Order 13859 
to maintain leadership in AI and to reflect the United States values.2 While these strategies 
have been announced, the rate of adopting automation in naval affairs remains slow. In the 
Chief of Naval Operations’ 2018 article, “A Design for Maritime Superiority,” the CNO’s 
first priority is to design a future integrated naval force structure and to “Put All Hands On 
Deck to make the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) ready as a warship as soon as practically 
possible.”3 Xi Jinping called upon the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to evolve to future 
“intelligentized warfare.” The AI superpower navies compete to adopt automation and AI 
technologies for persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. This thesis 
compares the technological adoption of two critical automation sensors—U.S. Aegis and 
China’s Type-348 “Dragon Eye” and how they improve naval intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance (ISR).  
Since the Cold War, maritime superiority has come to rely on automated early 
warning systems from interconnected ISR platforms. Automation for maritime Indications 
and Warnings (I&W) was heavily embedded in conventional naval capabilities between 
the United States and then-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). After the fall of 
the Soviet Union, China steadily rose and has been seeking the use of Artificial Intelligence 
(AI) to augment its military’s cognitive capabilities at an ever-faster rate, especially with 
respect to the future of sea power. The automated communications link, called Link-11 or 
                                                 
1 Flora Sapio, Weiming Chen, and Adrian Lo, trans., A New Generation of Artificial Intelligence 
Development Plan, State Council Document [2017] No. 35 (Beijing: Chinese State Council, 2017), 
https://flia.org/notice-state-council-issuing-new-generation-artificial-intelligence-development-plan/. 
2 Donald J. Trump, “Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence: Executive Order 
13859,” Federal Register 84, no. 31 (February 14, 2019): 3967–72. 
3 John Richardson, A Design for Maritime Superiority, Version 2.0 (Washington, DC: Department of 
the Navy, 2018), https://www.navy. mil/navydata/people/cno/Richardson/Resource/Design_2.0.pdf. 
2 
Link-16, between aircraft carriers, naval aircraft, and submarines allows human operators 
to send messages over internet computer systems instantaneously. 
This study focuses on the adoption of automation-based platforms by the U.S. Navy 
and People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Examples of naval ISR platforms include: 
ship automation, manned and unmanned systems, aerial reconnaissance satellites, 
computer systems that visualize the identification and location of naval platforms at sea. 
This topic is important because of three key factors: policy on rapid AI technology research 
and development; the return of Great Power Competition (GPC); and the need to mitigate 
uncertainty and enhance judgment. However, prior geopolitical incidents show that 
automated systems can be prone to erroneous, unstructured or unsupervised data due to 
device misconfiguration and human error. Receiving the right data, at the right time, at the 
right location is critical to understand the adoption of automation for future sea power. 
The scope of this study regarding the key areas includes: strategy of automation; 
aids to decision-making (speed); and critical intelligence systems in space that enable 
automated tools to work. The overview of the impact in adopting automation is bounded 
by national defense and policy strategy documents by the United States and the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC). Strategic implications of adopting critical intelligence systems 
will be discussed. 
It is critical to adopt and harness today’s automated technologies. Technological 
adoption of emerging technologies relies on frequent software updates and compatible 
hardware to successfully operate; otherwise, the system will not operate as desired or 
originally designed. Another way to conceptualize this process of adopting and integrating 
a 2020 piece of technology is to think of integrating a modern Bluetooth speaker or radio 
into a 1980s vehicle; possible, but the attempt to integrate incompatible software or 
hardware will come at a cost and can likely break down and cause incompatibility is the 
absence of redundant tests prior to fielding or employing an automation system or AI tool 
on a naval ISR platform. 
3 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
How are the U.S. Navy and the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) adopting 
automation to improve naval ISR with Aegis and Type 348 radar sensors for future sea 
power? 
BACKGROUND 
Half a century ago, General William C. Westmoreland, the U.S. Army Chief of 
Staff, had a vision of future warfare that rings true today. In his speech, given on October 
14, 1969, to the Association of the United States Army, he stated,  
On the battlefield of the future enemy forces will be located, tracked and 
targeted almost instantaneously through the use of data-links, computer-
assisted intelligence evaluation and automated fire control…and with 
surveillance devices that can continuously track the enemy, the need for 
large forces to fix the opposition physically will be less important.4  
General Westmoreland encapsulated a vision of adopting constant surveillance, 
tracking, and targeting with computers to instantaneously track the enemy.5  
The prominent Stanford University computer science professor, Andrew Ng, AI 
developer and business executive believed just as electricity transformed almost everything 
over a century ago, today it is hard to think of an industry that will not be touched by AI in 
the coming years.6 His vision seems to be coming true, and today’s software program that 
provides maritime domain awareness is called the Common Operating Picture (COP). The 
U.S. defense company Raytheon developed the COP to visually display naval air, land, and 
sea platforms in near-real-time. Picture dots on a screen identifying and locating naval 
platforms at sea based on their unique identifiers, or fingerprints, which is the manner in 
which GPS displays on a map. This is a form of AI application in which automation 
catalyzes the process and streamlines the data flow between aircraft, surface vessels, 
submarines, ground stations, and satellites. 
4 Frank Barnaby, The Automated Battlefield (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 1. 
5 Barnaby,  
6 Shana Lynch, “Andrew Ng: Why AI is the New Electricity,” Stanford News (14 March 2017), 
https://news.stanford.edu/thedish/2017/03/14/andrew-ng-why-ai-is-the-new-electricity/. 
4 
Since the 1950s, prominent leaders have researched and adopted pattern 
recognition of maritime platforms and its associated radar signature or signals in naval 
affairs. For naval ISR, a software program called Activity Based Intelligence (ABI) is “an 
analysis methodology which rapidly integrates data from multiple intelligence sources and 
sources around the interactions of people, events and activities, to discover relevant 
patterns, determine and identify change, and characterize those patterns to drive collection 
and create decision advantage.”7  
According to the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) computer scientist Professor 
Joshua Kroll, automation is an operation of a process according to a set of established rules, 
which are referred to as a set of explicit and implicit specifications. These rules can be very 
simple or highly complex and implemented by both humans and machines in a variety of 
ways. These rules are implemented and coded in an “if, then” logic in a software program 
and then can be coupled with a mechanical function and typically in tandem with humans.8 
Automation is beneficial because it automates a task, mechanically or visually, while 
avoiding human weaknesses such as fatigue and inattention. 
Automation and AI are imperfect and sometimes have specific errors. The systems 
rules or the output from the rules can be incorrect or incomplete, it can lead to a catastrophic 
event that would cause a stop or pause for research in automation.9 Human error can have 
a big part in system error as well.  
Naval sensors that automate data flow at sea have propelled naval operators and 
strategists to reshape the adoption of AI for the future maritime battlespace. The 
Department of Defense’s (DOD) Artificial Intelligence strategy has accelerated “the 
adoption of AI and the creation of a force fit for our time.”10 Simply put, using legacy 
                                                 
7 Chandler Atwood, “Activity-Based Intelligence: Revolutionizing Military Intelligence Analysis,” 
Joint Force Quarterly 77 (April 2015): 24–33. 
8 Joshua Kroll, “Classifying Machines by Kinds of Learning: Automation,” slide 3, https://nps.edu/
web/ai-consortium/harnessing-ai-course. 
9 Kroll, slide 21. 
10 Office of Science and Technology Policy, Summary of the 2018 White House Summit on Artificial 
Intelligence for American Industry (Washington, DC: White House, 2018), 4, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Summary-Report-of-White-House-AI-Summit.pdf. 
5 
technologies that work is valuable, but understanding how the AI superpowers are adopting 
game-changing technologies is critical to improving naval ISR. A fit way to adopt 
automation revolves around knowledge, access, and time for relevant and accurate early 
warning. 
The second approach is defining and understanding the literature of automation and 
AI, to include its perception within various sectors of society. There is not one accepted 
and concrete definition of automation. My approach will be to outline the standard 
definitions from government, military, public and private and compare their definitions to 
technical experts like computer scientists. When one says or hears the phrase AI various 
thoughts and images come to mind—images from lethal autonomous weapons destroying 
the adversary or killer robots to less intimidating images. The perception of AI can range 
from imagining sailors sitting in front of a computer screen on a ship to Apple’s Siri or 
Amazon’s Alexa technologies. The perception of automation can be as simple as an 
assembly line to streamlining signals automatically to control the flow of information and 
incorporated on a digital map to show where ships, aircraft, and submarines are located. 
The definition depends on whom you ask. 
The third approach is analyzing automation and AI capabilities today concerning 
naval ISR between the AI superpowers. China’s blue-water borders—also known as first, 
second, and third island chains and the “string of pearls” in the Indian Ocean. The fourth 
approach is conceptualizing and describing the design methodology for adopting 
automation coupled with AI emerging technologies that can be recycled, re-used, and 
turned around in less than six months to have the advantage of long-term strategy for 
adopting automation for naval ISR. This irregular method will incorporate measures of 
effectiveness and performance with a demanding timeline that encompasses aggressive, 
timely, and ethical standards. 
 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
My thesis methodology will be to develop an adaptive model for comparatively 
analyzing automation and AI capabilities today between the United States Navy and 
China’s Navy, to include their Navy’s Air Force component. The goal is to produce a 
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research methodology with precise and concise indicators and measurements for the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to observe and absorb heuristically, to act today, and re-orient 
when AI software begins to outpace current technology. In Chapter II, a literature review 
of automation and AI are defined and technical aspects of naval ISR are necessary to 
discuss, conceptualize, and use a simple working definition throughout this thesis. 
In addition to qualitative analysis, quantitative analysis will be conducted through 
both network analysis of contributing industry companies (private and public) in pursuit of 
developing an adoption framework for senior-level decision making and feedback systems. 
The purpose of a mixed methodology is to determine practices of automation for 
Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance. A thorough analysis of automation regarding 
ISR will allow for a better understanding of current trends and constraints for ISR in the 
maritime battlefield. It is important to note that the theory of adoption is usually based on 
the organization or the user; thus, I will discuss both. I will use Everett Rogers’ S-curve 
model of the diffusion process and examine the level of adopting automation for ISR within 
the last 50 years.11  
This thesis will encompass three specific automation systems that can connect to 
the two focus automation sensors and the cloud services both navies have adopted to store 
ISR data. The systems include unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs). In addition to the DOD enterprise-wide cloud solution, the United States 
has integrated the Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure (JEDI) Cloud Program, which 
can improve naval ISR support and stay abreast of China.12 There is little known publicly 
available information regarding the PLAN’s development plan for cloud services. 
However, in 2017, China’s Ministry of Science and Technology, which collaborates with 
                                                 
11 Mary Cain and Robert Mittman, Diffusion of Innovation in Health Care (Oakland, CA: California 
Health Care Foundation, 2002), http://kpworkforce.org/projects/include/DiffusionofInnovation.pdf. 
12 Department of Defense, DOD Cloud Strategy (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), 
https://media.defense.gov/2019/Feb/04/2002085866/-1/-1/1/DOD-CLOUD-STRATEGY.PDF. 
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the PLA, recruited the internet giants Baidu, Alibaba Group Holding, and Tencent 
Holdings—also known as BAT—for cloud computing.13 
Everett Rogers’ 1962 S-curve model of diffusion process will help better 
understand the current adoption methods. For example, the U.S. Defense Acquisition 
System (DAS) and Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), and 
the 2020 Middle-Tier Acquisition (MTA) Pathway per DODI 5000.2 are U.S. acquisition 
models for technological adoption.14 I will also use quantitative measures to relate spatial 
and temporal network analysis of relevant companies, private and non-profit, that can 
positively and negatively contribute to the adoption of automation. The purpose is to 
possibly reveal companies’ proprietary rights and the distance or degrees of separation 
between them that may show weaknesses in the methodology and overall adoption process 
for future naval ISR. 
As a case study in Chapter III, I will provide an overview of Everett’s S-Curve of 
technological adoption and a step-by-step process to help with the process of adopting 
automation and AI for naval ISR. Other mentionable countries with AI strategies for 
adopting automated systems or AI tools to briefly be discussed in this thesis will be the 
United Kingdom, Russia, France, Iran, and South Korea. 
 THEORY OF TECHNOLOGICAL ADOPTION 
The theory of adoption, within the context of technology, has been a focus of 
researchers, commercial, and industry for decades. The modern term adoption is derived 
from one of the Roman forms of adoption, adoptio. This late 15th century French and Latin 
phrase adoptare comes from ad meaning ‘to’ and optare meaning ‘choose.’15 Simply put, 
                                                 
13 Meng Jing and Sarah Dai, “China Recruits Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent to AI ‘National Team,’” 
South China Morning Post, November 21, 2017, https://www.scmp.com/tech/china-tech/article/2120913/
china-recruits-baidu-alibaba-and-tencent-ai-national-team. 
14 J. Jerry LaCamera, Jr., “Rapid Acquisition - The Challenge to Accelerate” (NDIA 2019 Spring IPM 
Division Meeting, Herndon, VA: National Defense Industrial Association, 2019), https://www.ndia.org/-
/media/sites/ndia/divisions/ipmd/2019-04-meeting/207-middle-tier-of-acquisition-lacamera-
190508215620.ashx?la=en. 
15 Frederick Mish, “Adoption,” in Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (Merriam-Webster Inc., 
2004), 17. 
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one can choose an inanimate object, person, place, or thing or choose to change, or one 
will not change.  
The S-curve of technological adoption represents a theoretical framework to help 
conceptualize how one or an organization can successfully or unsuccessfully adopt a 
technology. According to American communication theorist and sociologist Everett 
Rogers, the successful adoption of an innovative technology occurs in a distributed bell- 
curve, S-shaped, which is derived from the diffusion curve with respect to time and 
normality (Figure 1). The five categories of the adoption system are: (1) innovators, (2) 
early adopters; (3) early majority, (4) late majority, and (5) laggards.16 Understanding of 
the stages within the S-shaped bell curve is important to the successful adoption of 
emerging technologies.  
Figure 1 depicts the rate of technology adoption in the form of a horizontal and 
stretched “S” with adoption on the Y-axis and time on the X-axis. This means that when a 
technology is initially adopted, it takes years for either the technology or market conditions 
to adjust or develop to the point where it hits an inflection point to achieve rapid adoption. 
 
Figure 1. S-curve Model of the Diffusion Process17 
When the market begins to become saturated, the curve flattens out and late adopters of 
technology are too late to adopt emerging technology and integrate into a competitive 
                                                 
16 Joseph P. Schwieterman and Lauren A. Fischer, “The S-Curve of Technological Adoption: Mobile 
Communication Devices on Commuter Trains in the Chicago Region, 2010–2015,” Journal of Public 
Transportation 20, no. 2 (2017): 1–18, https://doi.org/10.5038/2375-0901.20.2.1. 
17 Source: Schwieterman and Fischer, 3. 
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environment at the point of saturation, which is where the laggards reside. Naval leadership 
will find this useful because it means it is best to be at the inflection point of the S-curve, 
not at the beginning or the end of it. 
As populations grow, automation and AI emerging technologies will grow. The 
history of the S-curve idea began in the 19th century with the motivation of knowing more 
about the growth of humans. Rogers’ S-curve theory of adoption is based on the logistic 
function as a model of population growth that was first introduced by Belgian 
mathematician Pierre-Francois Verhulst in 1839. Verhulst related this theory to population 
growth and initially conceived his idea from the Englishman and political economist 
Thomas Malthus’ “An Essay on the Principle of Population” in 1789. During this time, 
people worried about population growth surpassing food supply and the future of feeding 
the population. From 1950 to today, the population growth of the United States has grown 
from 330 million U.S. citizens to 1.4 billion Chinese citizens; contributing to a current 
population of 7.76 billion and counting.18 The more the human population grows, the more 
likely the thirst for knowledge not only humans but also automation and AI. People want 
more automated systems and to adopt AI technologies because they are typically faster 
than human beings, can consume more data, provide both intelligence and surveillance, 
and sometimes certain technologies are simply fun to use. 
An important corollary from the S-curve adoption theory is that the navies ought to 
build companies on technologies that have grown and experienced failures to achieve 
successful adoption. Some technologies include AlphaGo deep-learning system and IBM’s 
DeepMind subsidiary of Google to play the strategy game of Go, or Weiqi. In 2016, the 
computer system AlphaGo defeated South Korean Grandmaster Lee Sedol.19 For both AI 
superpower navies, this simulated game relates directly to how both the sensors and 
computer systems between USN and PLAN learn about each other on the maritime 
                                                 
18 “Current Population Growth,” Worldometer, https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/. 
19 David Silver et al., “A General Reinforcement Learning Algorithm That Masters Chess, Shogi, and 
Go Through Self-Play,” Science 362, no. 6419 (December 2018): 140–44, https://doi.org/10.1126/
science.aar6404. 
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battlefield. The adoption and growth of technology translate well to the life cycle pattern 
and measured as a cumulative growth over time. 
The growth of automation technologies since the 1950s is not a surprise and is 
imperfect. According to Modus the S-Curve, “is derived from the law that which states that 
the rate of growth is proportional to both the amount of growth already accomplished and 
the amount of growth remaining to be accomplished.”20 The limitations are inherent to risk 
and uncertainty over time. Like the life cycle—periods of birth, growth, puberty or 
maturity, and death—the S-curve stages serve as the key mechanism to decelerate, 
accelerate, shift gears, or stop completely and start fresh. Not every specific naval sensor 
or computer system designed for ISR is going to achieve perfect knowledge of the maritime 
battlefield. 
This observation is recognized and utilized in the commercial sector. Former CEO 
of Google and board member of the DOD Advisory board Eric Schmidt believes the 
problems are straightforward. He believes computer vision is easily understood if we build 
reliable systems in which we understand failure modes and error rates.21 Receiving, 
analyzing, and disseminating information and intelligence via Aegis with computer 
systems connected to sensors with a time gap creates a recognized frustration among the 
younger operators who envision computer systems and AI applications, like a high-
resolution video game, is a weakness in adopting automation.  
Human beings use automation software applications to solve problems. It is 
important to understand that automation is currently not capable of making intelligence 
assessments. AI simulates cognitive functions of the human brain and computer vision 
displaying data. In the United States Navy, the human operators behind the machine use 
                                                 
20 David Lindgren, “Global Remittances and Space-Based Cryptocurrencies: A Transformational 
Opportunity for the Post-2030 Agenda,” in Post 2030-Agenda and the Role of Space, ed. Annette Froehlich 
(Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2018), 79, https://www.springer.com/gp/book/
9783319789538. 
21 Paul Scharre, Anthony Cho, and Eric Schmidt, “Eric Schmidt Keynote Address at the Center for a 
New American Security Artificial Intelligence and Global Security Summit” (Washington, DC: Center for 
a New American Security, November 17, 2017). 
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the rule-based automation system which displays radar signals. The data at rest—the data 
in the computer not being used or manipulated—is limited to the amount of data input. 
Change in adoption theory is inescapable. Similar to American historian Elting 
Morison’s research and reflection process, much of the adoption of automation centers 
around four distinct parts: the initial condition “at the point of origin of any mechanical 
change; the character of the primary agents of change; the nature of those resistant to 
change; and the means to facilitate accommodation to the changes introduced.”22 Without 
understanding and enduring these parts, one cannot rise above the threshold of existing 
bodies of knowledge. 
In 2020, we are in another time of tremendous technological development and 
return of GPC by which maintaining future sea power depends on superiority in the fourth 
dimension of cyberspace. Russia’s President Vladimir Putin once said, “Artificial 
intelligence is the future, not only for Russia but for all humankind. It comes with colossal 
opportunities, but also threats that are difficult to predict. Whoever becomes the leader in 
this sphere will become the ruler of the world,”23 Automating simple tasks and adopting 
AI tools, even with legacy systems, demands a change in today’s GPC and national 
security. 
  
                                                 
22 Elting Morrison, Men, Machines, and Modern Times (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1966), 7. 
23 “‘Whoever Leads in AI Will Rule the World’: Putin to Russian Children on Knowledge Day,” RT World 
News, September 1, 2017, https://www.rt.com/news/401731-ai-rule-world-putin/.. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The U.S. naval intelligence team on the carrier is searching for the last location of an 
unknown, Chinese Kilo submarine. The radar returns visualized as automated dots appear on 
shipborne computer screens which show two Chinese warships. There is some ambiguity in 
their identification, current time, and location. The operator watch team on the aircraft carrier 
using AI software sees automated dots in motion appear with unique identifiers of Chinese 
fighter aircraft taking off from Hainan Island in the South China Sea (SCS). Chinese fighter 
aircraft have a radar signature, such as identification, and then U.S. Navy ISR collection 
platforms and sensors can collect the data to provide situational awareness. This 
technological exchange of information is like how commercial aircraft can be identified or 
identify other aircraft while flying. A naval intelligence team of six notices the automation 
and do what is necessary—notifies the watch and immediately provide timely, relevant, 
accurate indications and warning (I&W). The Carrier Strike Group (CSG) decision-makers 
operating in the SCS are depending on an early warning. One of several computer screens 
using automation tools, fueled by algorithms or software, shows pixilated dots on a computer 
screen with a geographic map of SCS as the background. The tactical action officer, Surface 
Warfare Officers, and the team of intelligence officers and specialists track dot(s) on 
computer screens. The dot represents a Chinese destroyer, under the command of the 
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), approaching USS Wayne E. Meyer (DDG-108) 
conducting Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS). Automation tools, powered by 
AI algorithms, provide precise time, distance, course, and speed to allow situational 
awareness and early warning to react.  
The aforementioned vignette is representative of historical events in SCS that have 
sent a clear strategic message of mutual power projection and presence between the United 
States and China. Automation expedites maritime ISR and naval encounters at sea between 
foreign navies for situational awareness for both adversarial and commercial platforms. In 
2017, the U.S. Navy conducted at least six routine FONOPS, according to the Defense 
14 
Department.24 Further, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) collects and uses 
data for Maritime Activity-based Intelligence (MABI) software, which provides: geo 
reference time and location similar to Google Maps; sequence and data neutrality for 
unbiased data; and, integration before exploitation.25 In September 2019, USS Wayne E. 
Meyer—named after the father of the Aegis combat system—conducted FONOPS near the 
Paracel Islands (located in the northern part of South China Sea). In response, Chinese 
military vessels and aircraft attempted to deter the U.S. warship from sailing near the 
Chinese-claimed islands.26  
The purpose of this chapter is to gain a better understanding of automation and AI. 
This will be organized through five subsections: (1) South China Sea historical vignette; (2) 
a literature review on prominent leaders from America and from China who are experts in 
the field of AI and automation; (3) definitions of automation and AI; propose my working 
definition of automation and AI-based on existing literature, publications, and doctrine 
between technical, government, and public experts; (4) conceptualize automation and, (4) a 
succinct technical overview understanding of naval ISR about the two sensors. 
 AI POLICY AND STRATEGY DOCUMENTS 
For foundational purposes, I cite four national strategy and policy documents: 
Department of Defense Directive (DODD)27; Joint Publication 1-0228 and 2–0129; and, two 
                                                 
24 Caitlin Doornbos, “Freedom-of-Navigation Ops Will Not Dent Beijing’s South China Sea Claims, 
Experts Say,” Stars and Stripes, April 4, 2019, https://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/freedom-of-
navigation-ops-will-not-dent-beijing-s-south-china-sea-claims-experts-say-1.575609. 
25 Patrick Biltgen and Stephen Ryan, Activity-Based Intelligence: Principles and Applications 
(Boston: Artech House, 2016), xx. 
26 Jesse Johnson, “U.S. Warship Challenges Chinese Claims in Disputed South China Sea,” Japan 
Times, September 14, 2019, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/09/14/asia-pacific/u-s-warship-
challenges-chinese-claims-disputed-south-china-sea/#.Xhd7aMhKj_M. 
27 Department of Defense, Autonomy in Weapon Systems, DOD Directive 3000.9 (Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 2012), https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=726163. 
28 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint 
Pub. 1–02 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2016), https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp1_02.pdf. 
29 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations, Joint Pub 2–01 
(Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996), http:// www.hsdl.org/?view&did=3737. 
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summaries of AI Strategy by the United States30 and China.31 The first is DODD 3000.9, 
which “establishes DOD policy and assigns responsibilities for the development and use of 
autonomous and semi-autonomous functions in ISR systems, including manned and 
unmanned platforms.”32 The second is JP 2-01 (Joint and National Intelligence Support to 
Military Operations), specifically the ISR section on integrated operations and intelligence 
activities and synchronization of OPINTEL and ISR automated visualization (of collected 
data).33 The third is the 2018 Department of Defense Summary of the 2018 Department Of 
Defense Artificial Intelligence Strategy: Harnessing AI to Advance Our Security and 
Prosperity, which discusses harnessing strategic and focused deliverable AI.34 The fourth is 
China’s 2017 State Council “New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan” 
(AIDP), which aptly focuses on science, technology, industry, market, and societal 
perception.35 These policy documents are the most important driving sources for AI strategy 
and development. 
Existing literature on automation for sea power suggests that time, demand, and 
resources are critical factors in succeeding in adopting AI. According to the Fiscal Year 2020 
DOD Defense Budget, $927 million is dedicated to expanding AI to expand military 
advantage with the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) and Advanced Image 
Recognition (Project Maven) and $3.7 billion for autonomous and unmanned vehicles.36 The 
                                                 
30 Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 Department of Defense Artificial Intelligence 
Strategy: Harnessing AI to Advance Our Security and Prosperity (Washington, DC: Department of 
Defense, 2018), https://media.defense.gov/2019/Feb/12/2002088963/-1/-1/1/SUMMARY-OF-DOD-AI-
STRATEGY.PDF. 
31 Sapio, Chen, and Lo, A New Generation of Artificial Intelligence Development Plan. 
32 Department of Defense, Autonomy in Weapon Systems. 
33 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations. 
34 Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 Department of Defense Artificial Intelligence 
Strategy. 
35 State Council, “New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan [国务院关于印发新一代
人工智能发展规划的通知],” July 8, 2017, ttp://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017- 07/20/
content_5211996.htm. 
36 Office of Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Defense Budget 
Overview: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2020 Budget Request (Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 2019), https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2020/
fy2020_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf. 
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most recent 2020 White House budget document regarding the non-defense AI agencies 
listed a $1,291,000,000 FY20 request compared to the FY19 estimate of $1,248,000,000. 
However, both commercial and private industries are leading innovation in emerging 
technologies. The Trump administration has identified non-defense AI spending as a 
supplement to the president’s FY 2020 budget request. According to U.S. Chief Technology 
Officer Michael Kratsios, the budget released in September 2019 shows $654.4 million 
dedicated to the U.S. government’s non-defense spending by agencies related to AI.37 This 
supplemental document aligns with Executive Order 13589, signed by President Donald 
Trump in February 2019, specifically to maintain leadership in AI in the federal research and 
development sector. 
The two institutions most relevant to AI for naval ISR spending are Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Intelligence Advanced Research 
Projects Activity (IARPA). According to the White House, IARPA oversees several AI 
projects: developing AI models for cybersecurity, analyze autonomous systems policies, 
improve the interface between humans and intelligent systems, and develop counter AI tools 
(i.e., TrojAI). DARPA oversees next-generation AI and “explainable AI,” programs such as 
developing machine learning techniques and enable human users to understand, trust and 
manage AI partners.38 However, DARPA budget figures for AI research and development 
are not publicly available. 
The strategies, policies, and budget for automation are the fundamental basis for 
gaining a shared sense of understanding of automation and AI. Next, this literature review 
will cover the history of thought leaders, a variety of definitions, and my working definition 
to better grasp both terminologies and ultimately, improve the adoption process. 
 PROMINENT LEADERS OF AUTOMATION 
In 1969, then-U.S. Army Chief of Staff General William C. Westmoreland stated, 
“On the battlefield of the future enemy forces will be located, tracked and targeted almost 
                                                 
37 National Security & Technology Council, 11. 
38 National Security & Technology Council, 15. 
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instantaneously using data-links, computer-assisted intelligence evaluation, and automated 
fire control. With first-round kill probabilities approaching certainty, and with surveillance 
devices that can continuously track the enemy, the need for large forces to fix the opposition 
physically will be less important.”39 His outspoken vision resonates today with 24-hour real- 
and near-real-time ISR.40 Because of General Westmoreland’s vision, automation has long 
been a focus of the United States military to rapidly provide early I&W against adversaries 
at sea. 
1. History of Automation from Prominent American Leaders 
Stanford computer science professor and recipient of the Association for Computing 
Machinery Turing Award Edward Albert “Ed” Feigenbaum did much to pioneer AI.41 In the 
1980s, he defined AI research as the “part of Computer Science that investigates symbolic 
reasoning processes and the representation of symbolic knowledge for use in inference.”42 
Feigenbaum’s concept was an important contribution to the future success of AI. 
Feigenbaum describes AI as a process to simply start and continuously research and develop 
AI and then to think about how to best represent that knowledge. His definition describes the 
best way to represent such knowledge is through a symbolic way such that the target 
practitioner, or operator, can digest and use the technology.  
Feigenbaum’s strategic design centers around a direct partnership between three 
main entities for the efficient and effective flow of information. He emphasizes dialogue 
between the expert and the knowledge engineer directly because this process marries expert 
designers, knowledge engineers, and the user or operator. As a result, the early exchange of 
                                                 
39 Frank Barnaby, The Automated Battlefield (New York: The Free Press, 1986). 
40 The term “real-time” is defined as current time and “near-real-time” are naval platforms that naval 
operators manually add to an automation situational awareness tool; also known as Common Operational 
Picture (COP). 
41 Nils J. Nilsson, “Edward A (‘Ed’) Feigenbaum: United States - 1994,” Association for Computing 
Machinery, A.M. Turing Award, 2019, https://amturing.acm.org/award_winners/
feigenbaum_4167235.cfm. 
42Edward A. Feigenbaum, “Expert Systems in the 1980s” (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 1980), 
https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:vf069sz9374/vf069sz9374.pdf. 
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information facilitates an environment to accomplish a specific task or goal at hand.43 
Sparking an early and continuous dialogue between the three main entities is crucial in 
contributing to the success of AI.  
From a technical perspective, the goal of the “expert system” is to design and write a 
computer science program that will automate the problem faster. According to computer 
scientist and founder of the International Journal on Artificial Intelligence Tools Nikolas 
Bourbakis, AI helps achieve a high level of performance for difficult problems and difficult 
for a human to solve on his or her own.44 Therefore, expert systems produce an effective and 
direct flow of information logically between the three main entities. The architecture of this 
expert system, however, limits the relevant and accurate information. This is where the 
knowledge engineer filters out irrelevant information and methods or mechanisms within the 
field of AI. 
Technological innovators believed after the industrial age and information age comes 
adopting the automation age. In the year 2000, Admiral William A. Owens’ Lifting the Fog 
of War, expressed that we live in the fourth “Age of Automation”45 He believed the most 
notorious example of new technology was Adolf Hitler’s 1940s blitzkrieg, or “lightning 
war,” because its purpose was to bring about a swift victory and combine the use of radio 
communication, air and land support, and tank division. The users in the “lightning war” 
were operators with critical information that had to be shared with both the knowledge 
engineer and experts to adopt the automated system on the land battlefield. The concept and 
the testing of automated systems on land helped advance the adoption of automation. 
British Army officer, military historian, and strategist J. F. C. Fuller writes about the 
origins of flight, satellite connectivity, and wireless capability advancing the “Age of 
Automation.” He first describes the first flight on December 17, 1903, at Kill Devil Hill, 
Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, where two brothers, Orville and Wilbur Wright, flew a power-
                                                 
43 Barnaby, The Automated Battlefield. 
44Nikolas G. Bourbakis, ed., Artificial Intelligence and Automation (Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific 
Publishing, 1998), 210, https://doi.org/10.1142/3079. 
45 William A. Owens, Lifting the Fog of War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 80. 
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driven airplane for twelve seconds and the best flight was in 69 seconds. Fuller writes about 
the second invention encompassing the space domain in 1887 when a German Physicist 
Heinrich Rudolf Hertz was the first man to conclusively prove the existence of the 
electromagnetic wave where an electrical spark propagates into space. He then describes the 
third invention of wireless capability. Later in 1897, an Italian electrical engineer Guglielmo 
Marconi invented a device to detect said electric spark or waves and wirelessly transmitted 
a message over 3,000 miles in 1901.46 These scientific inventions are the bedrocks that 
revolutionized both military and naval affairs to adopt automated systems. 
Prominent scientists and theorists inspired the U.S. military to take advantage of 
flight, satellite connectivity, and wireless capability for future naval ISR capabilities. For 
example, then-CNO Adm. George W. Anderson, Jr. oversaw the first U.S. nuclear-powered 
aircraft carriers USS Enterprise (CVAN-65). Automation on nuclear-powered carriers today 
could not evolve if it were not for the first aircraft carrier. In addition to advancements in 
naval aircraft carriers, Research and Development Corporation (RAND) funded three Logic 
Theorists—Allen Newell, Cliff Shaw, and Herbert Simon—to present a computer problem 
solving-program.47 In 1956, Stanford professor John McCarthy and Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology (MIT) professor Marvin Minsky hosted the Dartmouth Summer Research 
Project on Artificial Intelligence (DSRPAI).48 The popular desire for AI in both the military 
and academia realms increased the demand for adopting AI. 
However, overhyped emerging technologies and huge expenses hindered the 
advancements of automation. Computer scientists Peter Norvig and Stuart Russell wrote that 
the AI headline news in the 1950s typically read “Electronic Super-Brains” and “Faster Than 
Einstein,” but the hype in media was only part of the incubation for adopting automation.49 
                                                 
46 John Frederick Fuller, Armament and History: The Influence of Armament on History from the 
Dawn of Classical Warfare to the End of the Second World War (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 1998). 
47 Rockwell Anyoha, “The History of Artificial Intelligence,” SITN Blog (blog), August 28, 2017, 
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Both Norvig and Russell understood that the demand was present, but two issues prevented 
the adoption of automation or AI. In addition to a high price, they stated that computer 
processors could not store or “remember” input data, and computers cost over $200,000 per 
computer and simply too costly of an investment.50 
2. History of Automation by Chinese Prominent Leaders  
The vision of automation and AI to modernize the Chinese Navy from 1958 to 1962 
began with the Great Leap Forward, shifting its organizational structure. The leap 
represented a catalyst because of the Sin-Soviet dispute; abandoned the previous balanced 
development strategy; and, gave birth to a new social organization called the people’s 
commune.51 Under the Communist Party of China (CPC), then-Chairman Mao Tse-tung had 
the vision to reconstruct the country from an agrarian economy to a communist society to 
leap ahead of competing neighbors and adversaries. The Chinese sought to change its navies 
like that of the Soviet Gorshkovian doctrinal changes which were then echoed by Admiral 
Liu Huaqing.52 Chinese naval thought leaders began to appreciate and take advantage of the 
value of their navy for sea power and maritime domain awareness.  
Two prominent PLAN admirals, Liu Huaqing and his successor Zhang Lianzhong, 
contributed to the future of China’s naval force projection and rapid response capabilities, 
according to James Lilley, former U.S. ambassador to China in 1989, and James Shambaugh, 
George Washington University Professor on China policy.53 As the Commander of PLAN 
from 1982 to 1988 and then-Vice Chairman of the Military Commission, Admiral Huaqing 
designed a strategy to promote the PRC’s 1982 naval maritime plan to move from coastal 
                                                 
50 Robert Garner, “Early Popular Computers, 1950 - 1970,” Engineering and Technology History 
Wiki, January 9, 2015, https://ethw.org/Early_Popular_Computers,_1950_-_1970. 
51 Roderick MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution: Volume II, the Great Leap 
Forward 1958–1960, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983). 
52 Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, 2nd ed. (Abingdon, UK: 
Routledge, 2009). 
53 James Lilley and David L. Shambaugh, China’s Military Faces the Future (Abingdon, UK: 
Routledge, 1999), 27. 
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defense toward a blue-water capability in incremental 10-year plans.54 This vision led to 
increasing demands for advanced technology in a three stage strategy for maritime defense. 
In Artificial Intelligence and Automation by Nikolas Bourbakis, PRC Xi’an Jiaotong 
University Professor Hongyi Wang discusses issues about AI related to organic systems to 
knowledge development issues and unifying the gap between computers and human 
brains.55 This definition paves a pathway that starts knowing what the problem(s) are, drives 
through development, requires structuring and/or visualization, and unification between a 
human being and the computer. In a way, his point describes a marriage between two separate 
entities designed to bring forth increased intelligence to help solve problems faster and 
together. 
PLAN seeks to end U.S. maritime superiority across both the Pacific and the Indian 
Oceans by technologically advancing its fleet. According to the Office of Naval Intelligence 
analysts, Adm. Huaqing, a member of the Chinese Academy of Science, assisted then-
President Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Central committee’s 
Politburo to help shape the future of PLA.56 In 1988, Admiral Lianzhong designed “sea-
denial” out to the first chain of islands to about 150 miles from the mainland, otherwise 
known as access and area denial (A2/AD). This defense strategy is known as “defense in 
depth” and its purpose is to surveil and defense its sea borders with conventional and nuclear 
submarines, long-range aircraft, and surface vessels.57 China’s methodology for achieving 
maritime superiority receives tremendous support from its thought leaders in academic 
universities that brought forth its naval ISR vision to fruition. 
In contrast to Feigenbaum’s “Expert Systems,” China’s approach heavily weighs the 
initial development stage. Kai-fu Lee is very authoritative for this topic in technology 
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between China and the United States.58 He is the chairman and COE of Sinovation Ventures, 
a Chinese-based technology-focused investment firm, and has held vital positions in Apple, 
Silicon Graphics, Microsoft, and Google where he was president of Google China. In his 
book “AI Superpowers,” he estimates automation will decimate up to 40–50 percent of jobs 
worldwide.59 This is the trade-off in adopting more automated systems and AI technologies 
that decision-makers can consider in the adoption process. 
In July 2017, the State Council of China released the “New Generation Artificial 
Intelligence Development Plan,” which is a strategy to build a domestic AI industry worth 
nearly U.S. $150 billion and to become the leading AI power by 2030.60 AI Industry 
Development Alliance, a co-sponsored alliance between more than 200 enterprises and 
agencies nationwide to develop China’s AI industry. The 2016–2018 Chinese Three-Year 
Guidance for Internet Plus Artificial Intelligence Plan was written for socioeconomic 
development. Three-Year Action Plan for Promoting Development of a New Generation 
Artificial Intelligence Industry (2018–2020) reinforces the AI development plans previously 
mentioned.  
In the adoption process, understanding and discussing the vision set by naval 
leadership can help decision-makers who are in the process of adopting automation and AI 
in the coming decades. The U.S. Navy leverages major university researchers and computer 
scientists to adopt automation and AI. The PLAN’s Three- or Five-Year development plans 
and AI strategy lay out the adoption process and executing each step in a rapid pace. The 
next section will cover the various definitions of automation and AI. 
 ON DEFINING AUTOMATION AND AI 
This section will explore the evolution of automation and AI over the last 70 years. 
The purpose of discussing the definitions of automation is to shed light on the contrasting 
definitions, derived from both the U.S. and China’s AI strategy documents to gain a better 
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understanding of the history of adopting automation of naval ISR and the current adoption 
progress.  
Humankind derives from homo sapiens—wise man—because our cognitive 
capabilities are important in our everyday lives when making decisions. Human beings in 
the private, public, and commercial centers have constantly developed new superior tools 
and technologies to solve a problem faster; they create it and then the Navy acquires and 
applies the tools.  
There is no worldwide accepted definition of AI, according to prominent AI 
researchers Kirsch, Allen, Hearst and Kirsh, Brachman, Nilsson, Bhatnagar, and Monett, and 
Lewis.61 Depending on whom one asks from different communities, categorizing the terms 
“AI” and automation and learning the levels of complexity will help design the fittest 
definition for the current strategies between the two superpowers.  
1. Working Definitions of Automation and AI 
The following table depicts my working definition of automation versus AI drawn 
from the elements of automation and AI experts since 1950. Based on the evidence from a 
diverse group of researchers and fields of study, automation and AI can be simple, complex, 
or extraordinary, ranging from prespecified to unpredictable and manual to automatic. 
Simply put, both the tools and techniques solve problems and attain goals. My working 
definitions are based on lists of definitions written by government personnel, academic 
researchers, and computer scientists (see Table 1). 
Table 1. Working Definitions for Automation and AI 
Automation Artificial Intelligence 
Automation is a technique of making a computer, a 
process, or a system operate automatically by a 
mechanical or electronic device that takes place of 
the human labor to accomplish a task or goal. 
AI is an evolutionary and combined field of study to 
create intelligent machines through a set of 
established rules in the form of algorithms to achieve 
a specific goal or set of goals. 
 
                                                 
61 Pei Wang, “On Defining Artificial Intelligence,” Journal of Artificial General Intelligence 10, no. 2 
(2019): 1–37, https://doi.org/10.2478/jagi-2019-0002. 
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AI has become an increasingly popular topic, but the term AI is something of a 
misnomer, according to NPS Professor John Arquilla.62 Computer software and algorithms 
are only productive and made “intelligent” when created, typed, and used by human beings. 
By software automation, we “rely on computer systems as much as possible in software 
development, in other words, to generate programs from information requirements 
automatically.”63 To simply put, without its creator, the computer itself or the data at rest 
cannot produce intelligence on its own in a way that human beings can, nor can it empathize 
or have a beating heart like a human being. Although a well-defined and acceptable definition 
differs and goals to achieving computer systems with these human-like characteristics and 
capabilities, automation is still not intelligent independent of the human being. However, to 
remain competitive and gain or maintain knowledge on the maritime battlefield, naval ISR 
is worth the effort to give this topic the time and space. 
2. List of AI Definitions and Strategies 
Table 2 shows a diverse list of definitions by technical experts compared to 
government and public experts on automation and the following table on AI. The 
International Society of Automation (ISA), a non-profit professional association founded in 
1945 defines automation as “the creation and application of technology to monitor and 
control the production and delivery of products and services.”64 In “Artificial Intelligence: 
A Modern Approach,” UC Berkeley professors Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig define AI as 
“the designing and building of intelligent agents that receive percepts from the environment 
and take actions that affect that environment.”65 This definition by its nature builds upon an 
idea similar to the human mind at first glance; however, unites the subfields of the following 
computer science skills: machine learning, pattern recognition, computer vision, speech 
recognition, etc. 
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Tables 2 shows a list of definitions of automation and AI between technical experts 
and military and government professionals. Table 3 displays the United States AI strategy 
and PRC’s development plan. 
Table 2. Definitions by Technical and Government/Public Officials 
Technical Experts:  
Computer Scientists, Data Scientists 
“The study is to proceed on the basis of the conjecture that every aspect of learning or any other feature of 
intelligence can in principle be so precisely described that a machine can be made to simulate it.”66
“By ‘general intelligent action’ we wish to indicate the same scope of intelligence as we see in human action: 
that in any real situation behavior appropriate to the ends of the system and adaptive to the demands of the 
environment can occur, within some limits of speed and complexity.”67
“AI is concerned with methods of achieving goals in situations in which the information available has a certain 
complex character. The methods that have to be used are related to the problem presented by the situation and 
are similar whether the problem solver is human, a Martian, or a computer program.”68
“A useful definition of intelligence… should include both biological and machine embodiments, and these should 
span an intellectual range from that of an insect to that of an Einstein, from that of a thermostat to that of the most 
sophisticated computer system that could ever be built.”69
“AI becomes a science (1987—present)” (Russell and Norvig, 2002), which was later changed to “AI adopts the 
scientific method (1987—present)” (Russell and Norvig, 2010), because “It is now more common to build on 
existing theories than to propose brand-new ones, to base claims on rigorous theorems or hard experimental 
evidence rather than on intuition, and to show relevance to real-world applications rather than toy examples.”70
“I suggest we replace the Turing test by something I will call the ‘employment test.’ To pass the employment 
test, AI programs must be able to perform the jobs ordinarily performed by humans. Progress toward human-
level AI could then be measured by the fraction of these jobs that can be acceptably performed by machines.”71 
“The creation and application of technology to monitor and control the production and delivery of products and 
services.”72 
66 McCarthy et al., “A Proposal for the Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial 
Intelligence.” 
67 Allen Newell and Herb Simon, “Computer Science as Empirical Inquiry: Symbols and Search,” 
Communications of the ACM 19, no. 3 (March 1976): 116, https://doi.org/10.1145/360018.360022. 
68 John McCarthy, Formalizing Common Sense: Papers, ed. Vladimir Lifschitz (New York: Ablex 
Publishing Corporation, 1990), 246. 
69 James S. Albus, “Outline for a Theory of Intelligence,” IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and 
Cybernetics 21, no. 3 (June 1991): 474, https://doi.org/10.1109/21.97471. 
70 Wang, “On Defining Artificial Intelligence,” 14. 
71 Nils J. Nilsson, “Edward A (‘Ed’) Feigenbaum: United States - 1994,” Association for Computing 
Machinery, A.M. Turing Award, 2019, https://amturing.acm.org/award_winners/
feigenbaum_4167235.cfm. 
72 Peter Mendel et al., “Interventions in Organizational and Community Context: A Framework for 
Building Evidence on Dissemination and Implementation in Health Services Research,” Administration 
and Policy in Mental Health 35, no. 1–2 (March 2008): 21–37, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10488-007-0144-9. 
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Government/Public: Military, Private, Public, Commercial 
“The theory and development of computer systems able to perform tasks normally requiring human 
intelligence, such as visual perception, speech recognition, decision-making, and translation between 
languages.”73 
“A branch of computer science dealing with the simulation of intelligent behavior in computers. The capability 
of a machine to imitate intelligent human behavior.”74 
“Artificial intelligence (AI), the ability of a digital computer or computer-controlled robot to perform tasks 
commonly associated with intelligent beings.”75 
“The field of computer science dedicated to solving cognitive problems commonly associated with human 
intelligence, such as learning, problem solving, and pattern recognition.”76 
“‘Create smarter, more useful technology and help as many people as possible’ ‘from translations to healthcare 
to making our smartphones even smarter.’”77 
“The ability of a machine communicating using natural language over a teletype to fool a person into believing 
it was a human. ‘AGI’ or ‘artificial general intelligence’ extends this idea to require machines to do everything 
that humans can do, such as understand images, navigate a robot, recognize and respond appropriately to facial 
expressions, distinguish music genres, and so on.”78 
“It is the science and engineering of making intelligent machines, especially intelligent computer programs. It is 
related to the similar task of using computers to understand human intelligence, but AI does not have to confine 
itself to methods that are biologically observable.”79 
“Advancing the file of machine intelligence and are creating new technologies to give people better ways to 
communicate.”80 
“Fundamentally exists to substitute work activities undertaken by human labor with work done by machines, 
with the aim of increasing quality and quantity of output at a reduced unit cost.”81 
73 “Artificial Intelligence,” in Oxford Reference, accessed June 8, 2020, 
https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095426960. 
74 Merriam-Webster Inc., “Artificial Intelligence,” accessed February 12, 2020, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/artificial%20intelligence. 
75 B.J. Copeland, “Artificial Intelligence,” in Encyclopedia Britannica, March 24, 2020, 
https://www.britannica.com/technology/artificial-intelligence. 
76 “What Is Artificial Intelligent?,” Amazon Web Services, accessed June 5, 2020, 
https://aws.amazon.com/machine-learning/what-is-ai/. 
77 Bernard Marr, “The Key Definitions of Artificial Intelligence (AI) That Explain Its Importance,” 
Forbes, February 14, 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/02/14/the-key-definitions-of-
artificial-intelligence-ai-that-explain-its-importance/#532664514f5d. 
78 This quote is attributed to Dr. Matt Mahoney, a data compression expert; Daniel Faggella, “What Is 
Artificial Intelligence? An Informed Definition,” Emerj, December 21, 2018, https://emerj.com/ai-glossary-
terms/what-is-artificial-intelligence-an-informed-definition/. 
79 Maki K. Habib, Revolutionizing Education in the Age of AI and Machine Learning (Hershey, PA: 
IGI Global, 2019), 6. 
80 Marr, “The Key Definitions of Artificial Intelligence (AI) That Explain Its Importance.” 
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Government/Public: Military, Private, Public, Commercial 
“Artificial intelligence (AI) refers to the ability of a computer or a computer-enabled robotic system to process 
information and produce outcomes in a manner similar to the thought process of humans in learning, decision 
making and solving problems.”82 
(1) “Any artificial system that performs tasks under varying and unpredictable circumstances without
significant human oversight, or that can learn from experience and improve performance when exposed to
data.
(2) An artificial system developed in computer software, physical hardware, or other context that involves that
solves tasks requiring human-like-perception, cognition, planning, learning, communication, or physical
action
(3) An artificial system designed to think or act like a human, including cognitive architectures and neural
networks.
(4) A Set of techniques, including machine learning, that is designed to approximate a cognitive task
(5) An artificial system designed to act rationally, including an intelligent software agent or embodied robot
that achieves goals using perception, planning, reasoning, learning, communicating, decision-making, and
acting.”83
Table 3. U.S. and PRC AI Strategies 
United States People’s Republic of China 
“Artificial intelligence (AI) is one such 
technological advance. AI refers to the ability of 
machines to perform tasks that normally require 
human intelligence—for example, recognizing 
patterns, learning from experience, drawing 
conclusions, making predictions, or taking action—
whether digitally or as the smart software behind 
autonomous physical systems.”84
“Artificial intelligence has become the new focus of 
international competition. Artificial intelligence is 
thought to be the strategic technology leading the future, 
the world’s major developed countries regard the 
development of artificial intelligence as the major 
strategy to increase national competitiveness and enhance 
national security, therefore they intensify the introduction 
of plans.”85
“AI is already a popular concept, but there is not yet a 
universally accepted definition for it. The traditional 
approach to AI development is to study how human 
intelligence occurs and create machines that imitate 
human thinking and behavior.”86
82 Mike Quindazzi, “Artificial Intelligence and Robotics 2017: Leveraging Artificial Intelligence and 
Robotics for Sustainable Growth,” ASSOCHAM India, April 4, 2017, 7, https://www.slideshare.net/
MikeQuihumndazzi/artificial-intelligence-and-robotics-in-2017. 
83 “National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence Act of 2018,” § S. 2806 (2018), 2, 
https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/s2806/BILLS-115s2806is.pdf. 
84 Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 Department of Defense Artificial Intelligence 
Strategy. 
85 State Council, “New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan [国务院关于印发新一代
人工智能发展规划的通知],” July 8, 2017, ttp://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017- 07/20/
content_5211996.htm. 
86 China Institute for Science and Technology Policy, China AI Development Report 2018 (Beijing: 
China Institute for Science and Technology Policy at Tsinghua University, 2018), 9, 
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28 
The technical experts divide the definitions between theory and practice which have 
evolved since the 1950s. Computer scientists McCarthy, Newell, Simon, and Minsky 
believe in computers achieving goals to solve a specific problem that a machine can 
simulate in each environment.87 The government, private, public, and commercial trends 
toward productivity. This study shows that both technical experts and government 
researchers are more concerned about automation and AI performing a task to solve a 
problem expeditiously. AI experts and organizations such as Matt Mahoney, Facebook, 
Congress specifically point out the desire for AI to imitate human intelligence for better 
communication. 
In recent years, a revitalization of AI has erupted, partly due to the hope of 
successful new techniques such as machine learning and deep learning. Various categories 
of AI include Artificial Narrow Intelligence (ANI),88 Artificial General Intelligence 
(AGI),, and Artificial Superintelligence (ASI).89 Technical experts develop ANI, or 
“weak” intelligence, to perform a singular task such as human beings playing chess online, 
marketing trends, autonomous cars, and speech and pattern recognition. These new labels 
show that the meaning and definition of “AI” has changed or evolved beyond mainstream 
AI and is being re-branded, though the ideas of AI are not new. 
Besides the attempt to define AI based on its original meaning, though under new 
names now, the speculative nature of terms such as “superintelligence” by Kurzweil or 
“singularity” by Bostrom aim to achieve higher goals beyond human intelligence in 
machines.,90 Technical experts are attempting to develop AGI, or “strong” intelligence, to 
87 Bourbakis, Artificial Intelligence and Automation. 
88 “What Is Narrow AI?,” Narrow AI, accessed April 27, 2020, https://deepai.org/machine-learning-
glossary-and-terms/narrow-ai. 
89 Ben Goertzel and Cassio Pennachin, Artificial General Intelligence (New York: Springer, 2007); 
Pei Wang and Ben Goertzel, “Introduction: Aspects of Artificial General Intelligence,” in Proceedings of 
the 2007 Conference on Advances in Artificial General Intelligence: Concepts, Architectures and 
Algorithms, ed. Ben Goertzel and Pei Wang (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2007), 1–16. 
90 Ray Kurzweil, The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology (New York: Penguin 
Books, 2006); Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 2014). 
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a level of imitating the human brain. ASI is the goal of AI in which a robot demonstrates 
all human-like cognitive and physical being, like the human-like robot named Sonny in the 
2004 film “I, Robot” starring Will Smith.91 This study does not consider these concepts as 
realistic and will not analyze them in this thesis. Authors such as Wang, Liu, and Doughtery 
have argued that even though computer programs or algorithms can replicate human tasks, 
AGI is not the same as human flesh or human experiences and will not lead to singularity.92 
The 2018 DOD AI Strategy explicitly states that AI one technological advancement 
that refers to machines performing a task that a human being would perform.93 China’s 
New Generation AI Development Plan—along with Made in China 2025 released in May 
2015—does not have a clear definition but, rather, focuses on the development stage within 
the science, technology, research, and development stage with the core AI policy on 
intellectual property and intellectual rights.94 Both nations with different values will likely 
have different definitions and perceptions of automation. 
3. Conceptualizing Automation 
The first step is to categorize automation and then separate the definitions into three 
levels of complex applications: simple, complex, or very complex, according to the 
consulting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC).95 Simple automation can be as simple as 
commercial use to manage Navy resources or personnel. Figure 2 conceptualizes how to 
adopt automation and AI because of the varying levels of complexity ranging from 
augmentation, assisted, and autonomous intelligence. 
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Figure 2. Human Decisions Supplemented by AI Along with AI 
Continuum96 
This graph was developed by PwC as an analytical tool to display how the AI 
continuum is different from each category of automation. The three main differences are 
assisted intelligence, augmented intelligence, and autonomous intelligence. In naval 
affairs, the U.S. maritime battlefield decision aid called the COP (see Figure 3), is an 
assisted intelligence tool that automates tracking of naval platforms radiating their unique 
identifiers at sea or on land.97 
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Figure 3. Common Operational Picture  
for Situational Awareness for Operators98 
4. Levels of Automation 
The human operators behind automated computers and offer machines can better 
adopt automation through understanding the various levels of automation. The Sheridan 
and Verplank’s Scale of Human-Machine Interaction on automation, shown in Table 4, 
describes levels 1 through 10 on systematic work that has been done to evaluate the key 
levels of automation. The highly automated systems such as the U.S. Aegis combat system 
and Dragon Eye improve automation for decision making and allows the human operator 
to make decisions within each level and make the final decision.  
 Table 4 conceptualizes the degree of automation one requests from entirely manual 
to entirely automatic (along the x-axis) and, the level of task entropy from prespecified task 
to unpredictable future requirements along (along the y-axis). 
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1 The computer offers no assistance: human must take all decisions and 
actions 
2 The computer offers a complete set of decisions/actions alternatives, or 
3 Narrows the selection down to a few, or 
4 Suggests one alternative, and 
5 Executes that suggestion if the human approves, or 
6 Allows the human a restricted time to veto before automation execution, or 
7 Executes automatically, then necessarily informs humans, and 
8 Informs the human only if asked, or 
9 Informs the human only if it, the computer, decides to. 
10 The computer decides everything and acts autonomously, ignoring the 
human. 
The concept of automation levels ranges from manual to full autonomy.100 
 
Based on research by Sheridan and Verplank, automation can override human operators to 
execute a task and may not be the fittest in a changing environment.101 While automation 
levels are designed for consistent quality control and performance checks, the levels of 
automation also assist with re-evaluation and adjustments for improvements in a system or 
management systems that can range from manual to fully automated. Thus, if he or she 
understands the various levels of automation, then the human operator can adapt to 
accomplish the mission (depending on the level of failure) when failure within automation 
may occur.  
 Sheridan and Verplank’s entropy scale from Figure 4 can helps decision-makers 
gain awareness and recognize the intricate level between entropy and automation and 
applied appropriate can better assist commanders in the business of naval ISR. 
                                                 
99 Thomas Sheridan and William Verplank, Human and Computer Control of Undersea Teleoperators 
(Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1978). 
100 Heather M. Roff and David Danks, “‘Trust but Verify’: The Difficulty of Trusting Autonomous 
Weapons Systems,” Journal of Military Ethics 17, no. 1 (2018): 20, https://doi.org/10.1080/
15027570.2018.1481907. 
101 Sheridan and Verplank, Human and Computer Control of Undersea Teleoperators. 
33 
 
Figure 4. Automation and Task Entropy Continuum 
to Help Solve Problems with AI102 
This study shows that there is a variety of definitions and interpretations of automation and 
AI across numerous studies. Most scholars, researchers, and commanders can readily agree 
that techniques can be automated, through a set of rules, for faster results by computers; 
normally a human being would take longer to accomplish several analytical or 
mathematical problems using a computer.  
 NAVAL ISR 
Part one of this research methodology will be a qualitative research design in five 
parts. First, I will discuss how naval leadership is adopting aircraft carriers, ships, and 
aircraft and to compare Western versus Eastern naval leadership. Second, I will breakdown 
the main intelligence domains within which automation and AI are used: IMINT, SIGINT, 
OSINT, MASINT, HUMINT. Third, I will cover the current development of hardware and 
software on U.S. Aegis, Ship’s Self Defense (SSDS) and Type-346 sensors, and relevant 
radars used for ISR. 
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1. U.S. Naval Leaders Pursue Automation and AI 
In the naval business of ISR, Western leadership has always had a keen eye and 
thirst to know and understand the adversary. Abraham Lincoln once said, “I do not like 
that man. I must get to know him better. I do not like that person, I must get to know them 
better.”103 Naval ISR is a profound art of war in the pursuit to know and understand the 
adversary and noticing a pattern of life at sea and abnormal or amalgam within a naval 
pattern of life; therefore, it contributes to understanding the Navy that which is better than 
one’s own Navy.  
Policy plays a key role in improving naval ISR. In Carl von Clausewitz’s On War, 
he states that “war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means.”104 United 
States Naval policy on ISR is promulgated in the 2017 Joint Publication 2-01.105 Naval 
ISR is an instrument to be used in times of war and peacetime where the sea is a highway, 
as Alfred Thayer Mahan put, “over which men may pass in all directions…familiar and 
unfamiliar dangers of the sea, both travel and traffic by water” has been easier and 
cheaper.106 Knowing the adversary or competitor requires the collection of intelligence 
and knowledge of what lies on the highways or sea lanes. The policy set by acting CNO 
Mike Gilday and his predecessor Adm. John Richardson is to maintain maritime 
superiority; the mission is to protect America from attack, preserve strategic 
influence…and to modernize the U.S. Navy.107 
Over the next decade, both the Ford-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier and the 
Chinese Type 001 “Liaoning,” Type 002 “Shandong,” as shown in Figure 5, and future 
aircraft carriers will remain symbols of maritime superiority and project power, but may 
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not be the main line of effort at sea.108 The aircraft carrier represents “National Command 
Authority and warfighting Commanders-in-Chief with a flexible force to respond to a wide 
variety of international challenges…four and one-half acres of sovereign-and mobile-
American territory that can project U.S. power whatever it might be required.”109 
However, part of the ISR situational awareness calculus will be greatly improved with both 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), unmanned undersea vehicles (UUV), and manned naval 
platforms. Unmanned and manned ISR platforms in addition to the Navy’s nuclear aircraft 
carrier and amphibious aircraft carriers—used to deploy troops on the ground—represent 
maritime superiority.  
 
Figure 5. Shandong (Type 001A) Aircraft Carrier110 
Where there is the naval theorist Mahan in the West, there is Sun Tzu in the east. 
Unlike the Western concept of not politicizing the military, the East has the opposite 
concept, which is to politicize the military because the party controls the military.111 The 
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PLAN is the party’s naval force and continues to build aircraft carriers. PLAN platforms 
today consist of  86 Missile Patrol craft, 28 Corvettes, 26 Medium Landing Ships, 28 
destroyers, and 41 frigates.112 The PLAN have more small missile boats, torpedo boats, 
and long-range weapons than aircraft carriers, which shows that China does not need 
aircraft carriers to operate effectively. 
2. PRC Naval Leaders Pursue Automation and AI 
Naval ISR can be viewed as an element of spy-craft on par with the livelihood of 
water and in execution, achieve great results. In Sun Tzu’s book “Art of War,” his chapter 
on the “Use of Spies” states, “Hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the wise general 
who will use the highest intelligence of the army for purposes of spying…Spies are a most 
important element in war, because on them depends an army’s ability to move.”113 Chinese 
naval leadership likely uses ISR as spies in support of moving the army when necessary.  
The PLAN is currently modernizing its naval battle group structure. In 2012 at the 
18th Party Congress, then-President Hu Jintao called for China to become a “maritime 
power.” In April 2018, President Xi-Jinping echoed this vision and stated that “the task of 
building a powerful navy has never been as urgent as it is today.”114 China’s 2019 Defense 
White Paper states: 
The PLA Navy (PLAN) has extended training to the far seas and deployed 
the aircraft carrier task group for its first far seas combat exercise in the 
West Pacific. It has organized naval parades in the South China Sea and the 
waters and airspace near Qingdao, and conducted a series of live force-on-
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force exercises codenamed Mobility and systematic all-elements 
exercises.115 
The PLAN’s modernization and extended sea training, live-fire exercises, and red 
versus blue exercises with its aircraft carrier task group indicate great improvement of its 
automation capabilities in the littorals (see Figure 6). This trend, set by President Xi-
Jinping, indicates the PLAN will likely develop and test automation and AI analytical tools 
to increase productivity in its training environment, in exercises, and operations to the far 
seas. Figure 6 depicts an approximation of PLAN’s order of battle in each theater of 
operations that can support naval ISR. 
 
Figure 6. China’s Military Power - DIA’s 2019 PLAN Fleet Composition in 
Support of Naval ISR116 
The major plans and timelines between the two navies illuminate their 
organizational differences. With China, its desires for rapid modernization is clear but 
focused more on developing automation. In Mao Tse-tung ‘s 1936 “Problems of Strategy 
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in China’s Revolutionary War,” the first chapter revolves around the laws of war being 
developmental at all levels in conjunction with China’s Five-Year Plan, which 
demonstrates a similar strategy of development for AI today.117 This plan specifies a major 
scientific and technological infrastructure construction plan through 2020 and “Defense 
and Dual-Use Plans and Strategies.”118 Today, both U.S. CNO and PLAN Commanders 
strongly emphasize automating naval ISR for situational awareness. 
3. Technical Naval ISR 
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance are three separate but vital functions 
that represent the defense trinity. The U.S. Navy-Marine team and the People’s Liberation 
Army Navy team orchestrate ISR for situational awareness in which automation plays a 
vital role in national security and national defense. On January 14, 1991, the Joint 
Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System, a new system called JSTARS, was the first 
operational employment and deployment during Operation Desert Shield (ODS) in the 
Persian Gulf.119 There was a strong belief and justification for ISR capabilities because 
locating and destroying Scud missiles in Iraq was a vexing problem not solved in the ODS. 
ISR via JSTARs was meant to fill this gap that could provide wide-area, long-range 
surveillance through a moving target indicator (MTI) and a battle management 
technological aid. 
JP 1-02, Department of Defense (DOD) Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms defines intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) as: “An activity that 
synchronizes and integrates the planning and operations of sensors, assets, processing, 
exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future 
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operations.”120 This joint intelligence operation consists of global naval ISR platforms 
that, when tasked, starts the first stage of a battle to locate and identify adversary forces or 
a specific target. As shown in Figure 7, the ISR process synchronizes with both intelligence 
collection management and current operations. 
 
Figure 7. Venn Diagram on ISR Visualization to Show Teamwork Between 
Intelligence Collection (J2) and Operations (J3)121 
Given the mission and task, the first stage of a battle is to locate, identify, and 
collect data from remote sensors such as Aegis automation system, visualize the data via  
computer software, such as GCCS; and, deliver relevant and accurate exploited and 
analyzed intelligence to the customer. ISR is quite the iterative process, slow or fast. 
                                                 
120 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 116. 
121 Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations, III–33. 
40 
4. U.S. Aegis 
There are two significant advanced automated weapons systems in the U.S. Navy 
and the PLAN, the west and the east, which accelerate and bring automation to life—Aegis 
and the Dragon Eye combat systems. First, Aegis has played a pivotal role over the last 
sixty years on adaptive ship’s self-against aircraft, anti-ship missiles, surface threats, and 
subsurface threats— “an integrated collection of sensors, computers, software, displays, 
weapon launchers, and weapons named for the mythological shield that defended 
Zeus.”122 Aegis was initially developed in November 1963, which was called the 
Advanced Surface Missile System (ASM) Project. Later in 1969, ASM was renamed to 
Aegis with an awarded contract to Radio Corporation of America (RCA), which is the 
legacy industrial corporation of Lockheed Martin. The only streamlined consistency was 
the comfortable jumper, bell-bottom style uniforms—called coveralls—that the Sailors 
wore while using this combat system. 
Historically, it has taken decades to field and successfully use automation for ship 
self-defense at sea. About 10 years after initial development, the Army-Navy SPY-1 radar 
associated with Aegis successfully tracked its first target at the land-based test site and then 
operated at sea onboard USS NORTON SOUND (AVM-1). It took nearly 20 to 30 years 
of research, development, and testing to successfully use this automation tool.123 For 
example, in 1982 the U.S. Navy conducted two successful intercepts with SM-1 missiles 
via TICONDEROGA-class cruisers (also onboard Arleigh Burke-class destroyers) and 
then in 1991, USS SAN JACINTO fired its first Tomahawk land-attack missile (TLAM) 
to strike Baghdad in Operation Desert Storm in the Red Sea.124 The COP, fueled by Aegis 
and SPY-1 radar, is significantly important for indications and warning for ship’s self-
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defense and executing a presidential order to launch and re-launch missiles on a prioritized 
target. 
Launching a strike on Baghdad set a precedent for launching a missile from the sea 
and human operators watching this launch on a screen similarly displayed as a video game 
console. The easiest way to track an aircraft or ship is by the navigational radar, which falls 
Naval law, according to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and Naval 
Warfare Planning 1–14M (Law of Naval Operations).125 This brought forth meaning and 
necessity for the U.S. DOD and the U.S. Navy, to have a justification to adopt naval ISR. 
The U.S. Navy is adopting automation technologies for battlespace awareness. 
“The battlefield technologies of electronic warfare, intelligence, and battlefield 
automation, as well as precision-guided munitions, thus generated responses in each of the 
services: Aegis for the Navy, AWACS for the Air Force, and CEWI for the Army.”126 For 
the navy, automating high energy laser weapons onboard Aegis Baseline 10, is being 
developed and testing onboard the future USS Jack H. Lucas (DDG-125) with SPY-6 radar 
by 2023.127 Lockheed Martin received a USD 150 million contract to integrate High 
Energy Laser Weapon Systems development, manufacture, and delivery for ISR.128 Ship 
automation combined with target acquisition benefits naval ISR by automating tasks for 
situational awareness and self-defense. 
Today’s Aegis program management is faster than the previous procurement and 
fielding timelines. For example, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations N9 department 
(Warfare Systems) implemented a $294 million in contracts for the “2-4-6” program for 
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modernizing existing Aegis ships, specifically cruisers that primarily serve as the air 
defense command.129 “No more than two of the cruisers are to enter the modernization 
program each year, none of the cruisers is to remain in reduced status for modernization 
for more than four years, and no more than six of the cruisers are to be in the program at 
any given time.”130 
5. PLAN Type-348 Dragon Eye 
Since the 1950s, the CCP inherited a large number of American and Japanese navy 
ships, and rest were provided by the Soviet Union after its collapse in 1991.131 This is the 
reason why PLAN Liaoning aircraft carriers look quite like the Russian Kuznetsov-class 
aircraft carrier. In 1998, the Chinese Research Institute in Nanjing developed a prototype 
Type 346 and upgrades to the Dragon Eye phased array radar utilizes the S-band to further 
improve surveillance radar for satellite communications, air traffic control, weather radar, 
and surface ship radar. 
Over the past twenty years, the PLAN has developed plans to make progress by 
combining foreign and domestic military equipment. According to China’s 13th PLA “Five 
Year Plan,” its Navy is moving toward an “Intelligentized Age.”132 To reach this level of 
intelligence and apply it to the Navy, the PLAN built two domestically designed naval 
destroyers (DDGs) with Aegis-like phased-array panels. The Mineral Me “Band Stand” 
one of PLAN’s data track and weapons control system with a passive range of 242 nautical 
miles (nm) and active range of 97 nm (some say up to 134 nm).133 As for PLAN’s data 
link system, the Chinese integrated datalink system is called the Joint Service Integrated 
Datalink System (JSIDLS), which plays the key, if not the most important role, in 
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connecting networks and communication for PLAN naval ISR platforms.134 Mineral Me 
and JSIDLS are very comparable to Aegis and Link-16. AI venture capitalists Kai-fu Lee 
would reinforce this behavior as “China copycats.”135 The challenge for the PLAN is not 
their automation and Dragon Eye sensor capabilities but, rather, their ability to adapt and 
operationalize their ISR equipment and platforms in a joint environment. 
The Chief of Naval Operation’s (CNO) Maritime Design 2.0 aims squarely at 
competing with Near Peer competitors such as China and Russia and the U.S. Navy must 
be agile to keep pace with technology. Automation is important because it helps us learn 
more about ourselves and how the U.S. Navy operates compared to the PLA Navy. First, 
it provides situational awareness for trend analysis or early I&W. Second, automation is 
more than your average fascination because it can automatically perform a task faster than 
a human being can. Third, algorithms written by humans help fill the human gap of 
understanding and recognize trends more quickly than a human can. While predicting the 
future in detail is near impossible, automation can assist human beings in recognizing 
patterns of behaviors or trends to increase the chances of forecasting what the opponent’s 
next move might be. Thus, continuously making the effort to continuously learn about 
automation combined with AI software can significantly contribute to the adoption process. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
Many theoretical and systems engineering design methods exist to illustrate a 
complex adaptive process of implementing automation and AI technologies. Less is 
known, however, about the dynamic process of adoption, including related factors about 
decisions as to how to increase or decrease adoption of automation and AI pertaining to 
naval ISR. According to researchers from George Washington University and New York 
University, the need for adoption becomes apparent because of a knowledge gap, a search 
for solutions, an initial decision to a specific technological solution, and an implementation 
of the solution.136 The overall goal is to identify emerging technologies with Artificial 
Intelligence across the S-Curve adoption framework that are possibly modifiable, and thus, 
demonstrate ways that improve naval ISR for sea power.  
 S-CURVE METHODOLOGY 
To explore the adoption of automation in naval ISR between the two AI superpower 
navies, this thesis will use Everett Rogers’ 1962 S-curve model of the diffusion process. 
This proposed step-by-step process would encourage the Department of the Navy to 
analyze both automated systems and AI for naval ISR every quarter within a fiscal year. 
Quarterly reports can help improve the adoption process with updated or upgraded tactics, 
techniques, and strategies, to harness new AI technologies. This “how to” format will be 
illustrated through a systematic and flexible design model that can be applied and re-
applied quarterly because of the emerging technologies that outpace current naval 
programs. Quarterly reports are critical feedback and auditing tool necessary to conduct 
performance measures and stay competitive. 
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 7 STEPS TO ADOPTING AUTOMATION AND AI FOR NAVAL ISR  
There are three major categories when applying the S-curve of technological 
adoption: (1) Construct: an idea or theory containing subjective and conceptual elements, 
(2) Pre-adoption phase: awareness of innovation (early innovators and early adopters), and 
(3) Adoption phase: adopter’s commitment to the decision.137  
1. Start with a “Campfire Talk” 
Beginning with a “campfire talk” can build a holistic way of understanding a 
competitor’s vision and where successful emerging technologies are applied along the S-
Curve. American strategist and the University of Virginia Professor Jeanne Liedtka 
encourages her readers to have an open mind of what the world might be, specifically a 
“‘purposeful space’—virtual rather than physical—in which particular activities, 
capabilities, and relationships are encouraged” to produce particular behaviors. This step 
is essential in building a process of design.138 The most important aspect relevant to initial 
campfire discussions can fundamentally be getting to know each other, and definition and 
perception of automation and AI priorities, and write the tasks that require solutions down. 
2. Categorize and Analyze the Competing Naval Leaders of 
Other Great Powers  
In this step, begin with the vision and strategic narratives for great sea power, and 
dive into the organizational and cultural factors. The rationale for choosing this method of 
analysis is that those in power make or create change in a complex and adaptive system. 
Thus, understanding the leaders will likely contribute to building awareness. By building 
awareness, the cognitive mind can recognize the subtle similarities and differences between 
competing naval powers. 
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3. Understand Each Intelligence Organization’s Technical
Capabilities
An easy approach is to use the SWOT technique, which is understanding Strengths, 
Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT). Specifically, this requires selecting a current 
situational awareness computer system, its associated radar capabilities, such as Aegis and 
Type-346, and the physical naval platform. If there are more weaknesses and threats, then 
the program or plan can be re-organized or canceled in order to build strength and create 
more opportunities to compete in leading in AI for future sea power.  
4. Select and Categorize Top-Performing AI through Social
Network Analysis (SNA)
This step gears toward identifying and leveraging key talent quickly. Key talent 
includes available or already-built software applications, hardware, and relevant 
researchers and developers on the market. A place to start is with open-source databases 
with subject matter experts, intelligence professionals, and operator professionals who 
publish his or her work online. For SNA, programming platforms such as RStudio, ORA, 
or Gephi can assist human operators in identifying well-networked and hidden talents 
worldwide (see the appendix). 
5. Combine Relevant and Operator-Oriented and Intelligence-
Oriented Services
This step helps generate or catalyze the flow of adoption from pre-adoption among 
the early innovators to adoption phase by promoting awareness to achieve automation and 
AI goals within each intelligence category. 
6. Review and Re-orient
Review and reorient for feedback, with oneself or with a diverse team, and return 
to the specific step to be addressed. Receiving senior level feedback within 10 weeks prior 
to quarterly reports is critical to competitive because the awareness and knowledge of 
specific automation or AI tool that shows a lack of progress, productivity, or compatibility 
degrades the design process in long-term strategy if the problem or set of problems are not 
identified throughout the process. 
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7. Publish and Make the Plan Accessible 
Lastly, finalize the plan and make it accessible upon publishing the quarterly 
measures of performance and effort from the commands and encourage flexible and 
changeable plans.  
These are the elements necessary for identifying and detecting where people or 
emerging technologies may or may not fall within the five categories of Rogers’ S-Curve 
model. Similar to American historian of technology Elting Morison’s research and 
reflection process, much of the adoption of automation centers change or resistance to 
change, and understanding why changes occur.139 With the steps in mind, I will use 
Morison’s research and reflection process to analyze the combined information and 
intelligence.  
 UNDERSTANDING THE S-CURVE THEORY OF TECHNOLOGICAL 
ADOPTION 
The history of the S-curve idea began in the 19th century with the motivation of 
knowing more about the growth of humans as a logistic function. In 1839, a Belgian 
mathematician Pierre-Francois Verhulst, who related this theory to population growth, 
introduced the logistic curve, or “S-curve,” theory. Verhulst initially conceived his idea 
from the Englishman and political economist Thomas Malthus’ “An Essay on the Principle 
of Population” in 1789. In this time, food supply was declining and therefore, feeding the 
greater population became difficult.  
However, since the 1950s, the growth of automation technologies has not been 
surprise. According to Modus the S-Curve, “the rate of growth is proportional to both the 
amount of growth already accomplished and the amount of growth remaining to be 
accomplished.”140 Understanding categories of people and their key or hidden talents can 
be applied to the S-curve. According to American communication theorist and sociologist 
Everett Rogers developed the diffusion of innovation theory in 1962, there are five 
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categories of the adoption (see Figure 8).141 The successful adoption of an innovative 
technology occurs in a distributed bell-shaped curve, S-shaped. The S-Curve is derived 
from the diffusion curve with respect to time and normality. The point of inflection or 
saturation to avoid is where the two lines intersect between early majority and late majority.  
Figure 8 depicts the rate of technology adoption in the form of a horizontal and 
stretched “S” with adoption on the Y-axis and time on the X-axis.  
 
Figure 8. S-curve Model of Diffusion Process142 
The five groups can be shown through the S-curve to understand who, at what 
sequence, and at what speed adopts emerging technologies. The first group of innovators 
are the first people to adopt an emerging technology without consumers or users testing it 
and account for an average of 2.5 percent of innovators. The second cohort is made up of 
early adopters and accounts for 13.5 percent. The early adopters are the second wave of 
purchasers. The third group is the early majority and account for 34 percent when the 
product has become mainstream products by this time. The fourth group are the late 
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majority and represent 34 percent and cautious adopters. The fifth group are the laggards 
and consist of 16 percent; similar to people who start to use the internet or smart phones 
today. These percentages can form a bell curve however, the sum of waves these groups 
adopting an emerging technology over time becomes in the shape of an S-curve in terms 
of time. 
The first group is the incubation period in which a technology has potential for 
growth or improvement but has significant problems to overcome before becoming 
mainstream. The next stage is where the technology has shown rapid improvement and 
cost efficiency. After this stage, the technology matures and shows limitations. Examples 
in modern society include Airbnb or Uber services and associated user-friendly AI 
applications. Typically, this growth can lead to the stereotypical name of disruptive 
technologies. 
Rogers’ theory can serve as a pivotal methodology of adoption. It opens a way to 
begin designing and strategizing how to adopt innovative technologies. For example, to 
stimulate strategy and game theory, there are strategy games such as AlphaGo deep-
learning system and IBM’s DeepMind subsidiary of Google to play the strategy game of 
Go or Weiqi (pronounced “way-chee”). In 2016, the computer system AlphaGo defeated 
South Korean Grandmaster Lee Sedol, which demonstrated an innovative technology that 
can beat a human being at a strategy game.143 This directly relates to a computer system 
that beat a human being with the strategic advantage of AI having both different strategic 
options and speed. 
 MILLENNIALS, GEN-Z, AND ZENIALS 
In the context of future sea power, the naval leaders in the next 10 to 20 years will 
be millennials and generation Z, also called Gen-Z. These are the groups of people who 
grew up with automation and AI technologies. Michael Dimock, a Pew Research Center 
researcher on U.S. politics, policy, demographics, and social trends, defines millennials as 
“anyone born between 1981 and 1996 (ages 23 to 38 in 2019)” and those born after 1997 
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are Gen-Z. For example, the U.S. intelligence specialists operating and maintaining the 
automation tools, ages 18 to 30, grew up with technologies; the tactical operators are also 
culturally known as millennials or Gen-Z. Both generations can be the best advocates to 
discuss awareness, recognize, and apply technological AI tools for ISR. It is important to 
note that early innovators, who can be in any age group, are typically found more frequently 
in the younger population because they used emerging technologies as a child and can 
identify and reveal inoperable or non-compatible issues quickly. 
Commercial and private sectors recognize automation and AI as engineering 
problems. Former CEO of Google and board member of the DOD Advisory board Erich 
Schmidt believe the problems are straightforward engineering problems that need to be 
“done right.” He believes the biggest issue remains with multiple systems not being 
compatible with one another. One of the solutions he proposes is to build reliable systems 
in which we understand failure modes and error rates.144 For example in the Navy, 
receiving, analyzing, and disseminating data via Aegis and multiple other computer 
systems inevitably creates a recognized frustration among the younger operators. Given 
the Navy’s antiquated system, this reveals a weakness in the adopting automation because 
envision computer systems and AI applications, like a high-resolution video game or Apple 
product; the adoption process here is a little behind “the curve.” 
 ALTERNATIVE OUTLOOK TO ROGERS’ S-CURVE 
Lessons learned from the past can be applied to the S-Curve model to show how 
and how not to adopt automation for naval ISR. As an alternative method, I will also use 
quantitative measures to show relational, spatial, and temporal network analysis of relevant 
AI researchers who are researching AI. Data will be from open-source and public databases 
such as Stanford University’s arXiv database and Clarivate Analytics’ Web of Science 
database.145 This will contribute to purely the awareness automation and AI research today 
to stay ahead of the curve of adoption.   
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IV. AI SUPERPOWER NAVIES ADOPTING AUTOMATION 
TODAY 
The ultimate impact will depend not just on how the principles actually 
shape DOD investments in AI, but in how the broader AI community 
perceives DOD actions.146 
—Professor Michael C. Horowitz (University of Pennsylvania) 
Great powers with a grand narrative about global affairs often have a gravitational 
pull. For example, after World War II, the U.S. government put forth all efforts to contain the 
Soviet Union. In the aftermath of 9/11, the Global War on Terror (GWOT) became a grand 
narrative. More recently, the U.S. and PRC have become driven to some extent by efforts to 
outpace or leapfrog over the other in the AI realm. We find ourselves—as shown from both 
governments’ national strategy documents, media coverage, think tanks, universities, public 
and private companies—in an era of “Great Power Competition” and the narrative today 
between the great powers of the United States and China increasingly relates to the arms race 
associated with the military application of Artificial Intelligence. 
 OVERVIEW 
This chapter will survey how the United States and China, as two AI superpower 
navies, are adopting automation and AI tools and where their naval ISR falls along the Rogers’ 
S-Curve of technological adoption. Specifically, it attempts to answer the following two main 
questions: How are the two AI superpower navies adopting automation for naval ISR in the 
domains of space, cyberspace, air, sea, and undersea? The purpose of this chapter is to develop 
a strategy and design method to adopt AI for naval ISR to stay on a healthy and competitive 
path for innovation. 
This chapter will begin by discussing AI and automation today for both USN and 
PLAN through the step-by-step process developed from chapter 3. In this qualitative research 
methodology, there will be three main parts: First, I will discuss the various intelligence 
                                                 




domains within which automation and AI are used for ISR: IMINT, SIGINT, OSINT, 
MASINT, HUMINT. Second, I will discuss the narrative and vision between the two naval 
leaderships. Third, I will select examples of automation and AI capabilities from each ISR 
domain: cyber, air, land, surface, and undersea. 
 DISCUSSION OF INTELLIGENCE AND TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES 
Automation represents an important emerging military technology and network 
infrastructure across the main disciplines of intelligence. There are five necessary ways of 
collecting intelligence that fuel automation in naval ISR, called “intelligence collection 
disciplines” or the “INTS” (see Figure 9).  
 
Figure 9. Intelligence Collection Capabilities for ISR147 
Open Source information is derived from publicly available information. Human Intelligence 
is the collection of information from human sources; Measures and Signals Intelligence is the 
collection discipline concerning weapons, overhead and airborne imagery, telemetry, and 
electronic intelligence. Signals Intelligence is the collection and interception of electronic 
transmission from communications, electronic, and foreign instruments that can be collected 
from ISR platforms. Lastly, Imagery Intelligence refers to the collection and analysis of 
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imagery, or photos, and geospatial information.148 Each intelligence agency has authorization 
and responsibility for each of the intelligence discipline and are key organizations to 
understand and consult with to improve collection, analysis and dissemination processes for 
ISR activities. Figure 10 depicts examples of manned and unmanned systems necessary for 
ISR collection from intelligence community satellites to underwater arrays. 
 
Figure 10. Manned and Unmanned Naval ISR platforms149 
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Active and passive sensors are two types of remote sensing. Active sensing means 
that the “sensor emits and subsequently receives energy,” to scan, detect, and then measure 
the radiation that is reflected or backscattered from the object.150 Active sensing is analogous 
to a cellphone that when turned on and sending text messages reveals the location of the 
cellphone. Satellites represent the critical part of the sensing process. When naval ISR 
platforms are operating at sea, satellites are the sole means to connect. Two disadvantages of 
active sensing, however, include giving away the radar’s location and the possibility of 
experiencing radio frequency or light interference.  
While active sensing carries these vulnerabilities, passive sensing merely receives, 
detects, and tracks information or objects by processing reflections from objects of 
illumination in the maritime and space environment, such as communications signals or 
broadcasts. Passive remote sensing utilizes third-party transmitters and the time of the signal 
sent and its signal reflected off an object occurs in a triangular fashion to locate a target. 
Passive systems use an automatic trigonometric function of a triangle that measures the time 
difference of arrival or time distance of arrival (TDOA) from the emitted signal and the 
receiving signal from the reflection of the object through radar or light.  
Sensor systems are: Radar (Radio Detection and Ranging) and LiDAR (Light 
Detection and Ranging). Both types can determine the range to a target where the time delay 
between emitting a radio wave (the signal) and return (receipt) is measured to establish 
kinematics (i.e., time, location, speed, altitude, and direction) of an ISR platform. For 
example, an aircraft sends out pulses and then reflects off the earth’s surface, which provides 
a position like GPS. LiDAR uses light (visible or infrared), both of which can provide 
elevation, range, and bathymetric surfaces.151 LiDAR advanced technology allows for 
signals to penetrate water and produce terrain mapping. While the plethora of data collected 
for terrain mapping exceeds the cognitive load of a human being, these automation systems 
can fuse radar and LiDAR information within a computer to provide the best battlespace 
picture at a faster rate for decision-makers.  
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 VISION AND STRATEGIC NARRATIVES: CATEGORIZE AND ANALYZE 
COMPETING NAVAL LEADERS 
Western leadership has always had a keen eye and thirst to know and understand the 
adversary. Abraham Lincoln once said, “I do not like that man. I must get to know him better. 
I do not like that person, I must get to know them better.”152 While philosophers of military 
affairs like Alfred Thayer Mahan and Carl von Clausewitz were imbued with Western 
political thought, which drives the U.S. Naval leadership today, Sun Tzu’s idea imbues with 
the ethos to translate Mao Tse-tung and the People’s war content to the sea. This is important 
to understand in order to avoid “mirror imaging” sidestepping stereotypical assumptions about 
Chinese naval leadership and how they would conduct operations compared with the 
American way of naval warfare. This is a profound aspect of the art of war in the pursuit of 
knowledge: to know and understand the adversary; and, noticing “pattern of life” at sea and 
any divergences from the normal naval pattern of life. 
1. U.S. Naval Leaders Pursue Automation and AI 
To pursue the adoption of AI for naval ISR, policy, and doctrine are the first steps in 
implementing changes. Policy plays a key role in improving naval ISR. Prussian General and 
military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, in On War, stated that “war is nothing but the 
continuation of policy with other means.”153 United States Naval policy on ISR is 
promulgated in the 2017 Joint Publication 2-01.154 Knowing the adversary or competitor 
requires the collection of information by ISR platforms and knowledge of what lies on the 
highways, or sea lanes. Naval ISR is an instrument to be used in times of war and peacetime 
where the sea is a highway, as Alfred Thayer Mahan put is, “over which men may pass in all 
directions…familiar and unfamiliar dangers of the sea, both travel and traffic by water” is 
easier and cheaper.155  
                                                 
152 Coenn, Abraham Lincoln. 
153 Clausewitz, On War, 69. 
154 See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations, Appendix B-1. 
155 Till, Seapower, 1. 
58 
CNO Mike Gilday and his predecessor Adm. John Richardson prioritized designs for 
maintaining maritime superiority and strategic direction toward GPC with “cyber sentries.” 
Then-Acting Secretary of the Navy Mr. Thomas Modly stated in his memorandum SECNAV 
Vector 11, “Take seriously your own role as a guardian of the digital information…Everyone 
in the DON enterprise must become a Cyber Sentry.”156 Mr. Modly believed the Navy 
personnel should guard their digital information and to do so as a sentry on guard, or as naval 
personal call it “on watch,” but through computers. He sent a strong message that contributed 
to the notion that the future of naval affairs will be increasingly automated and to prepare in 
the meantime to become a guardian of cyber as if it were a physical post. 
2. PRC Naval Leaders Pursue Automation and AI 
The PLAN represents the party’s naval force while being useful as an element of spy-
craft. In fact, the PLAN politicizes the military because the party controls the military.157 It 
is highly politicized because the party strictly controls the military. In the chapter, 
“Employment of Secret Agents,” in Sun Tzu’s book, Art of War, he states, “Hence it is only 
the enlightened ruler and the wise general who will use the highest intelligence of the army 
for purposes of spying and thereby they achieve great results. “Spies are a most important 
element in water because on them depends an army’s ability to move.”158 When necessary, 
Chinese naval leadership can use ISR as spies in support of maneuvering naval forces while 
building and modernizing its forces. 
3. Chinese Naval Modernization: String of Pearls and the New 
Maritime Silk Road 
While the United States has continually modernized its navy over the last 200 years, 
China is only now beginning seriously to modernize its naval power. In 2004, defense 
contractor Booz Allen Hamilton (BAH) coined the term “String of Pearls” in a report to the 
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Office of Net Assessment for the DOD to describe China’s long-term strategy to build 
partnerships from the Middle East to the South China Sea. China’s new maritime silk road 
plan increases the PLAN’s capabilities to improve naval ISR through a “String-of-Pearls” 
strategy.159 Since 2008 PLAN has developed its antipiracy operations and exercises in the 
Gulf of Aden—its first naval operation beyond China’s periphery to expand its interests in the 
far seas.160 Despite China’s lack of historical naval development, they are rapidly catching 
up to the U.S. Navy maritime superiority on the global stage. 
PLAN leaders were once open to a division of labor across the Pacific to avoid future 
miscalculations or incidents at sea. Since 2006, then-Commander of the PLAN Vadm. Wu 
Shengli called for safeguarding and securing China’s maritime rights, interests—near and 
abroad—and international sea lines of communications (SLOCs). Consequently, Admiral Wu 
led a major shift in naval operations to extend the PLAN navy beyond the littorals in the 
Pacific and the Indian Ocean. In May 2007, he proposed to then-Commander of PACOM 
Adm Timothy Keating, a division of labor where PLAN would defend the waters west of 
Hawaii and U.S. Pacific Fleet would protect the Pacific east of Hawaii.161 Chinese naval 
leaders desired to divide the Pacific Ocean and defending it between PLAN and USN naval 
assets. The PLAN’s leadership aspires to achieve great results through a layered defense using 
AI and ISR platforms to increase awareness of the maritime battlespace. 
Although “dividing and conquering” seemed fit for defending international waters 
together, this was not the priority of the U.S. CNO. On July 9, 2019, then-CNO Richardson 
and current PLAN Commander Vadm. Shen Jinlong agreed on “reducing strategic, 
operational and tactical risk between the two navies to minimize the possibility of any 
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misunderstanding or miscalculation” over video teleconference.162 This dialogue indicates 
that the U.S. priority is safety and risk reduction and while dividing the labor of naval defense 
across the Pacific might be a mechanism to keep safety, it was not implemented by PLAN or 
the USN. Automating the amount of information flow and adopting AI analytical tools for 
relevant and accurate results can help shape and attain the goals that both navies are competing 
for. 
 PLAN ISR AND AI 2020: EXAMPLES OF ADOPTING AUTOMATION 
AND AI  
This section explores a collection of automation and AI application examples related 
to naval ISR used by the PLAN. This exploration and analysis will encompass Over-the-
Horizon (OTH) radar, Global Positioning System (GPS) and satellites used for receiving and 
analyzing radar signals, the Dongdiao-class spy ship, autonomous undersea vessels (AUVs) 
for anti-submarine warfare, the advantageous use of social media and hacking, and undersea 
sonar “listening” devices. Part of the analysis will describe where the PLAN situates along 
the S-curve of technological adoption. 
1. PLAN’s AI Strategy and Development Plans 
The PRC and PLAN leadership are aggressively AI. On October 23, 2018, at the 
Beijing Xiangshan Forum, senior executive of NORINCO—China Ordnance Industries 
Group Corporation, China’s third-largest defense company—Zeng Yi said in a speech that 
there will be no people fighting in the future battlegrounds and by 2025, lethal autonomous 
weapons would be a commonplace because of the increasing use of AI.163 In 2016, Google’s 
deep-learning system AlphaGo defeated the South Korean weiqi world champion Lee Sedol. 
After its victory, the program was re-named AlphaZero, which was a “break-through” 
technology and surpassed the inflection point of the S-curve of technological adoption 
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because it incorporates analysis of past recorded games and data from the computer playing 
itself.164 This is an exemplary technology that became even more attractive to the military to 
employ both deep learning and neural networks as automation tools for naval ISR. 
The major plans and timelines illuminate Chinese organizational structure and with 
Three- or Five-Year Plans. In Mao Tse-tung ‘s “Problems of Strategy in China’s 
Revolutionary War,” the first chapter revolves around the laws of war being developmental 
at all levels in conjunction with China’s Five-Year Plan.165 The latest version of this plan 
specifies a major scientific and technological infrastructure construction program through 
2020 (see Table 5). Research for defense and strategic emerging technologies will likely 
continue to increase precision and range for Dragon Eye (Type-346) phased-array radar and 
its associated 3D air search radar “Top Plate” and therefore, expand the capabilities of the air 
and surface range for identification on future “mobile airbase.”166 
Table 5. 13th Year Plan: PLA’s Defense, Dual-Use Plans, Science and 
Technology Strategies 167 
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With support from President Xi Jinping, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) leverages 
global support and thus increases the need for ISR at sea (Figure 11). In 2013, BRI was 
designed for China to partner with Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe to build 
and rent out ports by building infrastructure in over 30 countries (i.e., rail lines, roads, bridges, 
oil and gas pipelines, and port facilities).168 Both the government and private investors, such 
as Silk Road Fund and the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), fund the Chinese 
government and its BRI at an estimated $200 billion, which is projected to reach $1.2 to $1.3 
trillion by 2027, according to Morgan Stanley.169 The goal is to gain worldwide public 
support and acceptance of China’s maritime plans in exchange for building infrastructure in 
over 30 countries and use automated systems to communicate. 
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Figure 11. China’s New Silk Road Called “String of Pearls” to Build and 
Expand Ports and Industrial Parks Across Southeast Asia, 
Including Sri Lanka, Kenya and Greece170 
China’s Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) doctrine relies upon strategic 
surveillance provided through a three-layer defense strategy designed to control maritime 
approaches (Figure 12). 
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Figure 12. China’s Anti-Access Area Denial Defensive Layers171 
The first, outer-most, layer includes anti-ship ballistic missiles, diesel, or air 
independent propulsion (AIP) submarines, and Over-the-Horizon Radars (OTHR).172 The 
second layer consists of long-and mid-range aircraft (with or without weapons) and 
submarines for strategic messaging, which can operate beyond China’s periphery. The 
third, inner-most layer, is closer to the littoral region and combines all ISR navy, air, land, 
and sea platforms. The geographical constraint from neighboring countries represents the 
main disadvantage for China, specifically, Taiwan, the Ryukyu (Japanese) archipelago, 
northern Philippines, and Borneo.173  
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2. PLAN Uses Automation to Test Its First Laser System Against 
U.S. P-8 Poseidon 
PLAN strategies above exemplify its mission and capability to adopt automation 
sensors for situational awareness. On February 17, 2020, PLAN Luyang III-class destroyer 
(Type 052D) reportedly lased a U.S. Navy P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol ISR aircraft 
assigned to the VP-45 squadron about 329 nautical miles west of Guam in the Philippine 
Sea. This was the first reported instance of a Dragon-Eye radar tested against its main 
competitor, the U.S. Navy. This radar technology aligns with its China’s 995 Plan and 
potential future execution of laser and explosive technologies, which naval ISR automation 
can identify, detect, and counter-lase faster than a human operator. 
3. Modernizing PLAN Aircraft Carrier 
The modernization of naval China’s forces, including aircraft carriers, will continue 
automating naval warfare. In 2012 at the 18th Party Congress, then-President Hu Jintao 
called for China to become a “maritime power.”174 In April 2018, President Xi-Jinping 
echoed this vision and stated that “the task of building a powerful navy has never been as 
urgent as it is today.”175 China’s 2019 Defense White Paper states: 
The PLA Navy (PLAN) has extended training to the far seas and deployed 
the aircraft carrier task group for its first far seas combat exercise in the 
West Pacific. It has organized naval parades in the South China Sea and the 
waters and airspace near Qingdao, and conducted a series of live force-on-
force exercises codenamed Mobility and systematic all-elements 
exercises.176 
PLAN’s modernization and extended sea training, live-fire exercises, and red-
versus-blue exercises with its aircraft carrier task group indicate great improvements in its 
automation capabilities. In unit level execution, the Luyang II–class (Type 052C) destroyer 
Haikou engaged a floating target with surface guns by using both radar and optical 
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guidance.177 According to Zhang Junshe, a senior researcher at the PLA Naval Military 
Studies Research Institute, Liaoning carrier operations “fired more than 10 air-to-air, anti-
ship and air defense missiles” and used air defense radar to hit targets at sea with both 
Chinese destroyers, frigates, one replenishment ship, and one attack submarine in the Bohai 
Gulf, which is west of the Korean peninsula.178 This trend indicates that the PLAN will 
likely continue to mimic the U.S. Navy’s actions in the far seas. This form of mimicking, 
or “mirror imaging,” is a type of cognitive trap the PLAN could be exemplifying. Mirror 
imaging is when human beings consciously or unconsciously assume the competitor thinks 
or acts like us because of how difficult it is to imagine someone else’s perception being 
different from our own perception.179 
4. China’s Satellites and Technology Giants 
Since the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, when Chinese missile tests, intended to 
intimidate, were suspected of failing in flight, much has changed.180 For example, Beidou, 
a navigational satellite system, is a centrally controlled satellite constellation that provides 
all-weather, accurate positioning, navigation and timing information, and leveraged by 
PLAN forces. The Beidou satellite constellation—manufactured by China Academy of 
Space Technology (CAST) and operated (China National Space Administration) CNSA—
serves as an alternative to U.S. GPS satellites. It is interoperable with existing global 
navigation satellite systems (GNSS) and increases accuracy to precisely determine 
position, and includes 35 satellites as of 2020.181 However, the China Academy of Space 
Technology CAST and operated by CNSA—which works across AI, surveillance, 
telecommunications, satellites, and the internet—discloses little open-source information 
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regarding policy, data, security, privacy, and censorship. By having radar stations, 
receivers, and increasing posts overseas, including in Djibouti and Australia, Beidou 
precisely collects and receives ISR data, and thereby provide precise positional data to 
PLAN operators at sea. 
In an echo of Rogers’ S-Curve, China was a late adopter of the global positioning 
system (GPS). Innovative nations who began developing GPS since its birth in 1973 
include: U.S. GPS, Japan’s Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS), the European Union’s 
Galileo GNSS, Russia’s Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS), and India’s The 
Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS), (operationally called NavIC or 
Navigation with Indian Constellation).182 The advantage of later adoption or being a 
laggard is observing, collecting, and analyzing the past lessons of other global powers 
building their own GPS system and then applying only the most advanced, successful 
satellite technical and business practices while avoiding past issues and mistakes other 
nations may have endured.183 
Since 2006, Yaogan satellites launched by China have improved naval ISR and 
reinforced China’s pursuit of great power status. According to the China Aerospace 
Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) and media outlets, on 29 July 2019, at 0347 
UTC, China launched three Yaogan-30 (Weixing-30) remote-sensing, possible SIGINT 
satellites into Chuangxin-5 (CX-5) constellation using a Long March-2C carrier rocket. 
Since 2006, this Earth-observing satellite constellation in Lower Earth Orbit (LEO) can 
potentially detect ships via radio emissions and related technical tests. LEO satellites can 
triangulate multiple sources to enhance the procedures of automation faster in a near-
continuous manner for naval ISR.  
At the operational level, satellite technology boosts naval ISR capabilities to 
provide near-continuous ISR collection, exploitation, and analysis of signals that support 
the defense-in-depth strategy. At the tactical level of the Chinese satellite systems, the 
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“architecture of 12 satellite constellation suggests that the purpose is to achieve a near-
continuous ELINT surveillance of the regions between 35 degrees North and 35 degrees 
South Latitude” to detect and locate incoming adversaries from its littoral waters through 
various access routes from the Indian to Pacific Oceans, according to the International 
Strategic and Security Studies Programme.184  
5. Automation for Long-Range and Early Warning: Joint Over-
the-Horizon Radar  
PLAN integrates long-range surveillance with its over-the-horizon backscatter 
(OTH-B) radar to provide long-range, 24/7 persistent coverage (see Figure 13). According 
to Janes, an intelligence and consultant company for defense and national security sectors, 
this conventional radar coverage extends up to 1,350 to 1,889 nautical miles (2,500 to 
3,500km), but is limited by the horizon, or curvature of the earth, and atmospheric 
conditions.185 OTH-B allows both the PLAN and the PLA to collect quality data from 
China while also leveraging the data for early indicators of where the U.S. Navy could 
potentially maneuver next (i.e., South China Sea, East China Sea, North Sea, or head 
straight to the Persian Gulf). OTH-B is an automated tool that represents a strategic 
advantage over the U.S. Navy and assisted by reconnaissance satellites. 
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Figure 13. China’s Long-Range Surveillance Capabilities Possibly Extend to 
Guam. Quality or Discrimination of Specific Class, Types, or 
Accurate Tracks is Undetermined186 
In favorable atmospheric and other weather conditions, this High Frequency (HF) 
signal can possibly detect incoming naval platform as far from the Chinese coast as Guam 
and triangulate a possible position using China-owned Beidou satellites to locate, identify 
and track maritime or naval platforms with radar technology, as depicted by the large blue 
swath (see Figure 13). This automation system, though not intelligent, provides a highly 
competitive edge and strategic defense against incoming ballistic missiles. 
Employing the S-curve, the PLA and PLAN OTH capabilities falls within the early 
adopters group. In 1945, the Harvard economic historian Professor Alexander 
Gerschenkron expressed the notion of “economic backwardness.”187 His notion 
exemplifies “the tendency on the part of backward countries to concentrate at a relatively 
early point of their industrialization on the promotion of those branches of industrial 
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activities” with rapid technical productivity.188 China’s “backwards strategy” to adopt 
specific ISR technologies releases tension from pre-industrialization conditions and waits 
for industrialization to overcome existing obstacles or technological challenges within an 
already progressing and industrial environment. Other nations that have adopted and 
exercise OTH capabilities: U.S. Skywave Radar, Australia’s Jindalee Operational Radar 
Network (JORN), France’s New Transhorizon Decametric System Applying Studio 
Methods (NOSTRADAMUS), Russia’s Container, and Iran’s Sepehr.189 Few details are 
known of these systems; however, the transmission of these radars can cause radio 
frequency interference. 
6. Future of Anti-Submarine and AI 
To date, the PLAN has deployed and experimented with autonomous surface 
vessels and unmanned underwater vehicles. Notably, the Sea Wing, or Haiyi, glider, 
developed by the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) Shenyang Institute for Automation, 
has high potential to be used as a stealthy underwater spy drone to scour the seas within 
the First Island Chain at a depth of 3.2 nautical miles (6 km). The Sea Wing is a buoyancy-
driven autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV).190 Sea Wing is advantageous because of 
its low acoustic signature and its ability to traverse large deep blue water with minimal 
energy to depths of 11,034 meters along the Marian Trench.191 Sea Wing has been known 
to operate in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean to support special operations by 
detecting submarines and gathering both intelligence and bathymetric data for future 
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operations.192 The risk of deploying AUVs occurs if a competitor seizes the drone in 
territorial or perhaps international waters, as in mid-December 2016 when China seized an 
America underwater drone.193 PLAN has the advantage of collaborating with Chinese 
universities to develop and invest in automation for undersea warfare. 
In the polar regions, the PLAN has taken advantage of AI as a more viable option 
for operating in harsh and sub-freezing conditions. In November 2017, PLAN deployed 
the Snow Dragon in company with the unmanned M80B seabed boat in an Antarctic 
expedition and through Ocean Alpha Co. PLAN’s adoption of AI and advanced algorithms 
in Sea Wing and Snow Dragon provides the strategic advantage in two distinct and opposite 
environments for remote sensing. AI ensures accuracy in the undersea vessels sailing route 
with GPS mapping to avoid obstacles. In freezing environments, M80B does not freeze 
until it is at -35℃ and can withstand this harsh condition. 
PLAN’s growing fleet with unmanned and autonomous vessels and swarm 
technologies represents current attempts to augment maritime swarm tactics both undersea 
and in the polar regions. For instance, PLAN attempts to aid in marine swarm tactics 
through a project for naval ISR called the 912 Project. In 2018, 56 miniature unmanned 
boats released a video demonstrating coordinated boat swarm tactics off the coast of the 
Wanshan Archipelago in the South China Sea.194 These special operations swarm tactics 
and undersea ISR platforms are in line with the 912 Project, a classified project to develop 
military underwater robots developed by Shenyang Institute of Automation of the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences, which coincides with China’s hundred-year anniversary of the 
Chinese Communist Party in 2021. From an “undersea great wall” in the polar regions to 
the Mariana-Trench, the 912 Project improves maritime domain awareness in an innovative 
way for swarming technologies. 
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7. China’s Observer Corps and AI Stalkers 
PLAN utilizes its special surveillance vessels like Dongdiao and Dadie Auxiliary 
General Intelligence (AGI) ships and Chinese Maritime Militia (CMM) as automated 
observers for early warning. The PLAN intelligence ship has the electronic capability to 
use AI to identify and locate maritime vessels or aircraft. The data-absorbing machine, 
PLAN’s Dongdiao-class AGI (Type 815G) spy surface ship, is purpose-built to intercept 
electronic and communications signals.195 In May 2018, the Chinese navy, and specifically 
intelligence gathering ships like Dongdiao, were disinvited from participating in Rim of 
the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercises, in response to China weaponizing the SCS.196 Joint naval 
exercises represent the optimal and complex tactical intelligence event for the PLAN to 
observe, gather data electronically, and then use AI to analyze other navies in action. 
As later adopters, PLAN has taken advantage of fusing the strategic design of an 
observer corps with automation and AI at sea with automation systems onboard ISR 
platforms to give some degree of advanced warning of adversary approach or attack. 
During WWII, the Royal Observer Corps, traditionally the eyes and ears of the RAF—a 
powerful partner to the Chain Home radar installation along the British coast—were 
designed to listen to the sound of incoming German aircraft using parabolic concrete sound 
mirrors and make visual sightings, both of which were then transmitted from Observer 
Posts to Group and Sector controls.197 PLAN has transcended this idea of an augmented 
observer complex system for early warning by utilizing CMM as possible observers, South 
China Sea islands as observer posts, and people using social media to exploit the possible 
location of naval vessels at sea.  
                                                 
195 In the July 2019, the Chinese surveillance ship reportedly monitored the international and joint 
Talisman Saber naval war games, which involved American, Australian, and Japanese naval forces. 
196 Ryan Pickrell, “A Chinese Warship Is Believed to Have Been Sent to Spy on War Games between 
the U.S., Australia, and Japan,” Business Insider, July 7, 2019, https://www.businessinsider.com/australia-
tracks-chinese-spy-ship-watching-talisman-saber-war-games-2019-7. 
197 Nick McCamley, Cold War Secret Nuclear Bunkers: The Passive Defence of the Western World 
During the Cold War (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword Military, 2007), 123. 
73 
8. Chinese Maritime Militia (CMM) “Little Blue Defenders” 
China uses CMM vessels to develop its great maritime power. As an external force 
and security force, CMM can be leveraged as a political tool to enforce disputed maritime 
claims of its islands, rapid responders toward contingencies at sea, and normalizing 
administrative control of the seas along the nine-dash line.198 CMM reconnaissance 
detachments can serve as early warning networks with 32 “mother ships” acting as third-
party nodes of surveillance in both low-intensity and high-intensity conflicts. The “Little 
Blue Defenders” help China dominate in AI with its overt ability to collect data and 
information around disputed islands (i.e., Spratly Islands, Scarborough Reef, Paracel 
Islands, Senkaku Islands) and provide the data to the PLAN. 
Due to the multi-role and nature of its special mission, the use of CMM falls within 
the category of later adopters. CMM serves as a strategic asset in peacetime and to preserve 
maritime rights and protect local fishermen. In a high-intensity conflict, CMM can support 
larger PLAN forces with mine laying, fuel and food replenishment, deceptive 
transportation of troops and ammunition, concealment, sabotage, etc. “Little Blue 
Defenders” strongly improve ISR coverage, potential gaps, and can serve as a targeting 
asset to report signals or electronic early warning of incoming competitors or contacts of 
interest at sea. The concept of using non-naval warships as early warning assets was also 
employed by Russian fishing trawlers during the Cold War. CMM is not innovative, but 
the PLAN has a unique advantage to easily operate in the littorals, along one coastline. 
9. Social Media and Open Source  
In social media and unclassified sources, PLAN servicemember using social media 
platforms is now subject to AI and automated bots monitoring their text messaging, social 
media posts, or geo-tracking their military movements. According to a consultant at 
Intelligent Biology and scholar at Georgetown University Medical Center Nicholas Write, 
“in order to prevent the system from making negative predictions, many people will begin 
to mimic the behaviors of a ‘responsible member of society’ to improve social control and 
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change the way they think.” This massive surveillance AI tool can be used to exploit the 
location or the deployment cycle of naval operations when PLAN servicemembers are 
posting or geotagging on Facebook, Instagram, or Twitter.199  
China can track U.S. naval forces through open-source sites that collect AIS data 
or filtering through Facebook and Instagram posts of sailors preparing to deploy. For 
example, in Marine Traffic, a public website, one can type and search “US Gov” or “US 
GOV VLS.” China can leverage AI tools like Marine Traffic to locate U.S. naval surface 
vessel its Automatic Identification System (AIS) locators are turned on.200 China can 
leverage this data by finding the unique maritime mobile service identity (MMSI) and 
Google search MMSI 303891000.  
10. PLAN Cyberspace Copy-Cats  
China’s role in cyberspace espionage occurs through state-sponsored Advanced 
Persistent Threat (APT) groups.201 APT groups focus on and are designed to steal data, 
disrupt operations, destroy infrastructure while collecting and prioritizing relevant 
information. APT1 cyber activities stem from the 2nd Bureau of the PLA General Staff 
Department (GSD) 3rd Department, also known by its Military Unit Cover Designator as 
Unit 61398. APT40, code name Periscope, targets countries of great strategic importance 
to China, like the United States. China dedicates about $14.9 billion (RMB 100 billion) to 
the Internet Investment Fund for Chinese Internet of Things and high-speed fiber optic 
cables, according to China’s 13th Five-Year plan in the USCC annual report.202 The 
evidence for IP theft and economic investment suggests that China is aggressive in its use 
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of cyber espionage.203 On the other hand, the U.S. 2018 Cyber Security Strategy 
emphasizes that China is “persistently exfiltrating sensitive information from U.S. public 
and private sector institutions” and has responded with adopting automation and AI for 
naval ISR to outpace China and PLAN’s AI strategy.204  
 U.S. NAVY ISR 2020: ADOPTING AUTOMATION AND AI 
Despite the PLAN’s efforts to modernize rapidly, the United States continues to be 
the world’s foremost naval force. American aircraft carriers represent “national command 
authority and warfighting Commanders-in-Chief with a flexible force to respond to a wide 
variety of international challenges…four and one-half acres of sovereign-and mobile-
American territory that can project U.S. power whatever it might be required.”205 The 
aircraft carrier constitutes a small and mobile American airport to sail and defend the seven 
seas and when deployed, the U.S. carrier strike groups can maintain its networks and 
rapidly respond to a crisis or in defense of international shipping with its naval network 
infrastructure. All of which makes an aircraft carrier an appealing target. 
The U.S. Navy has continued to advance its network infrastructure within carrier 
strike groups and in a joint environment. In 2016, then-CNO Adm. Richardson proposed 
the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC) to 
strategize and design countermeasures against PLA’s defense-in-depth threat.206 The 
concept of network-centric warfare links today’s network systems in local and wide-area 
networks. Networks that link SSDS as a whole have three main components: Cooperative 
Engagement Capability (CEC), which is a virtual “spiderweb” of various networks to 
connect and share data; Navy and Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI), which is a localized 
ship-centric, encrypted network; and Link-16, which connects all of the systems.  
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While CEC is not specifically an ISR program, this is the vein of the naval anatomy 
and network-centric body that allows many Navy sensors—from space to undersea 
systems—to create an automated picture of the battlespace. The Navy’s CEC has been 
successful in interconnecting multiple systems; from USS John F. Kennedy carrier battle 
group to today’s Nimitz-class and the upcoming Ford-class carrier strike groups. For 
automation and U.S. naval ISR data, the foundational system to pay attention to is the 
Distributed Common Ground Station Navy (DCGS-N). DCGS-N combined with CEC, 
intranet, and Link-16 forms networks within networks that allow identification, 
classification, and targeting.  
1. Ford-Class Aircraft Carrier: Aegis to SSDS Computers for AI 
In today’s Ford-class aircraft carriers, the U.S. Navy will keep the 50-year legacy 
Aegis computer system and advance its automation capabilities with a computer system 
called Ship’s Self Defense (SSDS) automation. The U.S. Navy has selected Lockheed 
Martin’s Ship’s Self Defense System (SSDS) Mk 2 5 Systems Engineering Agent (CSEA) 
today for next-generation Ford-class aircraft carriers. While Lockheed Martin made an 
initial bid in August 2017, it did not issue a press release until two years later, in August 
2019, which stated, “SSDS is a Combat Direction System that provides capability to defend 
against Anti-Ship Missile (ASCM) attacks…developed the Common Source Library 
(CSL) which enables efficient deployment of common software solutions across the 
Surface Navy, with variation techniques to customize for particular configurations.”207 
However, despite this delay from initial bid to press release and launch, both the company 
and the DOD needed time and space to develop the product and increase the 
interoperability of a diverse list of AI software and applications into one system. 
In adopting automation and AI across the Navy, pre-testing, and testing phases are 
essential phases to test compatibility between multiple networks and future software 
upgrades. For instance, the SSDS computer makes it easier for compatibility. This “plug 
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and play” unified software automates within one program rather than multiple systems, 
which is like the concept of Microsoft or Apple products being compatible with in-house 
products. This is a key and critical computer program to consider adding to the pre-testing 
and testing phases when adopting emerging technologies across both naval ISR systems 
and branch ISR platforms. 
The improved SSDS and HTI systems contribute to the Internet of Things (IoT) 
and suggest a continuous increase in automation in naval systems. The Hardware 
Technology Insertion (HTI) 16 infrastructure is a new software update to assist in 
battlespace awareness.208 For air contact, the Enterprise Air Surveillance Radars 
automates tracking for human operators, according to Jim Sheridan, Vice President of 
Naval Combat and Missile Defense Systems at Lockheed Martin.209 HTI updates for the 
Ford-class carrier will also be adopted on several other commissioned ships. SSDS 
Advanced Capability Build 20 (ACB 20) will be delivered to aircraft carriers and 
amphibious ships: USS George Washington (CVN 73), the amphibious assault ship USS 
Boxer (LHD 4) and the amphibious platform dock ships USS San Antonio (LPD 17) and 
USS Fort Lauderdale (LPD 28), according to Seapower magazine.210 Of note, the only 
U.S. naval platforms not to receive this update are the Zumwalt-class guided-missile 
destroyers. Building and implementing a network infrastructure to encompass both SSDS 
and HTI signifies a “leap over” any possible chasm or “fall-off” point from early majority 
adopters and getting closer to the inflection point along the S-curve of technological 
adoption. 
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2. Reconnaissance Satellites: ELINT, SIGINT, and Ocean 
Surveillance 
Reconnaissance satellites, combined with AI that automates detection and analysis 
of electronic signals, survey the oceans to identify and locate naval forces at sea at specified 
times. The time depends on when the reconnaissance satellites are overhead an area at a 
particular time. Satellites are categorized into four main orbits at specific altitudes: Low 
Earth Orbit (LEO) (372–621 miles), Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) (6,213—12,427 mi), 
High Earth Orbit (HEO) (310–29,825 mi), Geostationary (GEO) (22,236 mi), and 
Geosynchronous (GEOS) (22,236 mi). Each constellation has a capability and purpose that 
requires knowledge of three key capabilities: bandwidth, throughput capacity, and 
overhead or passing over a certain area and how frequently the satellite can pass over a 
specific area. Today, online companies develop AI to ingest and analyze data from radars 
and reconnaissance satellites to provide answers to these top three categories of required 
knowledge. In turn, open-source AI tools online provide a strategic advantage over China. 
Human operators can leverage open-source commercial AI websites to possibly 
determine the Chinese satellite trajectory and when it could be above a target area. For 
example, the Chinese satellite constellation called Yaogan can be used online through the 
commercial company LeoLabs. LeoLabs has developed an algorithm for overhead sensing 
times and locations using open-source data and three privately owned land radars (Poker 
Flat Incoherent Scatter Radar (Alaska, USA), Midland Space Radar (Texas, USA), and 
Kiwi Space Radar (New Zealand).211 Figure 14 shows the ability for anyone to view the 
website and view the orbital mechanics, available data, previous passes, next planned 
passes, recent state vectors, and other forms of metadata. 
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Figure 14. LeoLabs, Open-Source Private Company Designed to Provide 
Applications for Operating in Low Earth Orbit212 
As placed on the S-curve, U.S. private companies fall within the categories of 
innovators and early adopters. This AI tool has specific algorithms that provide visual 
analytics to show the human operator location and tracking data from open-source 
information on Chinese satellites, such as the Yaogan constellation in LEO orbit (Figure 
14). The available data includes metadata, particularly a satellite’s name, catalog number, 
country, and observed passes. Notably, this is a sophisticated AI tool may be leveraged to 
proactively avoid open-ocean surveillance. Part of the adoption S-curve that is critical to 
achieving success is investing in a capability that will provide a return on investment; and 
thus, Department of the Navy, however, will have to purchase the data before using the 
software to use this AI tool.  
Among these orbital reconnaissance satellites, to use AI tools, electronic signals 
can tell the identity of a platform based on its radar signature. ELINT is a means in which 
a machine and another machine sends signals to each other, and electronic signals are a 
type of SIGINT. The signal is the propagation of electromagnetic waves at specific 
frequencies. Each pulse has a signature or set of characteristics like a fingerprint which 
includes pulse width, pulse repetition frequency or pulse repetition interval, scan time, and 
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scan type; this automation software tool can potentially identify and determine the 
characteristics of the signals. AI can automatically analyze low to high-frequency signals 
at a faster rate than human beings. This is important for quick analysis of signals collected 
by naval ISR platforms for decision-makers. 
Electronic signals from active military radars illustrate how naval forces are 
operating. According to the Navy’s Credentialing Opportunities Online (COOL) program, 
naval cryptologists analyze radar signals from worldwide technical ELINT data to support 
naval ISR and national intelligence priorities.213 An automation ELINT tool called GALE-
LITE can provide rapid retrieval of data, track animation, histogram, scattergram, and other 
analysis tools; “this information is used to design weapons to penetrate the enemy’s 
defenses…electronic countermeasures to frustrate the enemy’s weapons” in a vicious 
cycle.214 The ability to gather intelligence via reconnaissance satellites can help better 
understand the other navy from short to long-range frequencies and ultimately, for early 
warning. Improvement to the adoption of an AI tool such as GALE can be upgrading or 
modifying notifications to make it user-friendly. 
3. Long Range: Over-the-Horizon Backscatter Radar 
Long-range early warning from OTH radar supports naval ISR in a global and 
multi-system strategic environment. The first long-range and passive operating system is 
the Army-Navy/FPS-118 Over-the-Horizon Backscatter Radar System (OTH-B) from the 
1970s. OTH-B is used “for a frequency modulation/continuous wave (FM/CW) radar 
capable of detecting and tracking objects at over-the-horizon range.”215 The purpose is to 
provide long-range surveillance of aerial approaches to the United States. Specific 
automation and AI software include Kiwi SDR, which can detect OTH radars and then 
automatically analyzes the active or passive signals as far as over the Pacific Ocean. Figure 
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15 depicts how AI has been adopted for breaking apart each bit of a Chinese OTH signal: 
possible frequency, type (naval surface platforms) and duration of the signal.  
 
Figure 15. Kiwi SDR Automation Software Identifies Possible Chinese OTH-
Backscatter Radar Signal Pulses and Analyzes the Frequency216 
Kiwi SDR falls within the category of early innovation of a highly advanced nature. 
Building the codes to implement this software coupled with human operators having to 
learn how to use and understand this program signifies innovation and early adoption. 
Although the entire process of Aegis or SSDS collecting and analyzing data for possible 
target acquisition and be complete in a few thousandths of a second and no single human 
being, the analysis of long-range detection radars can benefit from AI tools such as the one 
used by the company Kiwi SDR.217 Overall, the software helps human teams better 
determine a pattern or possibly detecting an anomaly. The technicalities or reviews on user-
friendliness is unknown about the Kiwi SDR.  
4. ISR Platforms and Laser Technology 
High-altitude aircraft to aircraft and automated systems organic to the carrier 
provide strategic theater awareness off-board the ship (inorganic ISR asset). Inorganic ISR 
platforms onboard the aircraft carrier include the following: P-3 Orion and P-8 Poseidon 
provides high-altitude submarine-hunting capabilities with onboard detection and ability 
                                                 
216 Source: Tate, “China Integrates Long-Range Surveillance Capabilities.” 
217 Barnaby, The Automated Battlefield, 32–33. 
82 
to drop sonobuoy listening devices (active and passive radars); EP-3 can collect signals 
emanating from other maritime platforms, Global Hawk are all inorganic assets and MH-
60R for hunting submarines, E-2 Hawkeye provides air early warning with a massive disc-
shaped radar to share data with other aircraft beyond the carrier; F/A-18 Super Hornet 
provides visual identification with sensor-to-shooter and targeting capabilities, and the E/
A-18G Growler is the specialized version of the Super Hornet that provides tactical and 
electronic jamming. This complex mobile airport system that uses organic and inorganic 
automation allows the U.S. Navy to extend its reach to classify, identify, engage, and 
respond to crises or threats beyond a mere 200 nautical mile distance. 
Lasers provide an organic naval capability designed to counter ISR against threats 
or naval platforms being lased but may cost more than it is worth. For counter-ISR, the 
U.S. Navy has developed and installed the first Optical Dazzling Interdictor, Navy (ODIN), 
laser weapon system to blind or disrupt unmanned aerial systems threatening U.S. forces 
(Figure 16).218 This technology requires a high level of directed energy and power—
sometimes enough to power a small city—with a low circular error probable (CEP) if 
automated calculation to send high directed energy is accurate. The probability of hitting a 
target manually can be extremely difficult and the system requires extensive locational data 
and in real-time from the ship’s sensors. The major threat and necessity for AI within a 
computer system is to decrease the CEP while being able to react against other incoming 
threats. Other incoming threats can include future swarms of AUVs or countering other 
technologies that may lase ISR cameras or optic sensors. 
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Figure 16. Lockheed Martin’s Optical Dazzling Interdictor, Navy laser 
Designed for Counter-ISR219 
When refueling aircraft, AI software within semi-autonomous aircraft reduces 
human labor and provides surveillance capabilities on the maritime battlefield. Northrop 
Grumman’s X-47B Unmanned Carrier Air System (UCAS) conducted its first flight in 
February 2011 and from 2012 through 2015 conducted touch and goes from USS Harry S. 
Truman and USS George H.W. Bush. Because of the iterative software tests, the first-ever 
airborne refueling between a Boeing 707 and UCAS occurred in April 2015 and the AI 
software inside this testbed became the new AI configuration for the Navy’s MQ-25A 
Stingray. In addition to surveillance, because there are only nine air wings for 10 aircraft 
carriers, this brilliant automation example can offload human labor and extends the range 
of an F/A-18 Super Hornet beyond its 500 nautical mile range.220 This AI-infused 
unmanned aircraft can conduct aerial refueling and surveillance, which will further 
automate naval warfare while extending the distance of naval aircraft range. 
At sea, the fully autonomous ship “Sea Hunter” provides antisubmarine warfare 
capabilities with AI applications and is cheaper than the P-8 Poseidon. Sea Hunter, which 
was developed by DARPA and U.S. defense companies Leidos and Sonalysts, can patrol 
the maritime domain for up to 70 days and range of possibly 10,000 nautical miles, and 
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only at $20 million per unit, according to The National Interest.221 With one exception, 
this aircraft provides ISR to monitor Chinese submarine activity with less human labor and 
less in price.222 
5. Cyberspace and Social Media 
Social media improve naval ISR missions in terms of identifying, tracking, and 
locating naval platforms worldwide. For example, MarineTraffic and FleetMon, which 
automate ship tracking and maritime intelligence, are websites generated by AI programs 
to openly track radars actively emitting at sea (see Figure 17). The data from open-source 
companies are gathered from a network of coastal AIS-receiving stations, satellite 
receivers, and algorithms to identify, integrate, and track shipping, trade and logistics 
worldwide.223 The algorithm within this analytical tool can show past tracks and 
background information. Purchasing the data in bulk can help fill the gap of unknowns and 
improve the quality of AI tools or resources. 
 
Figure 17. Marine Traffic Tool Tracks Chinese Maritime Militia (Left), 
“Liaoning” CV-16 Operating in North Sea Fleet (Right)224 
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However, three major trade-offs are associated with this AI tool. First, maritime 
tracking algorithms cannot provide continuous ship tracking if AIS is not transmitting data 
or if the human operator does not have the exact name to search for a vessel. Second, 
increasing automation and associated radar systems, AIS can be active and useful for 
military tracking, particularly if one knows or can find the key name or MMSI is known or 
can be found. Third, data must be available, accessible, bought, or easily transferable 
through user-friendly databases or cloud-based services. Purchasing bulk data, integrating 
a mix of open-source AI software tools can benefit ISR tracking compared to using several 
separate resources. 
The Navy, Special Forces and DOD writ large can utilize AI software, such as 
Primer.ai, to quickly filter through online documents regarding the current geopolitical 
situation and the competitors’ intent, strengths, and weaknesses. The Silicon Valley-based 
AI software called Primer.ai reads and writes thousands of open-source documents with 
machine learning assistance. CEO and founder of Primer Sean Gourley, Vice President of 
Solutions Architect Ben Van Roo, and Director, National Security Group Brian Raymond 
have developed an AI-assisted organization, summarization, and report updates on global 
targets.225 Key events, information, or tone are extracted among relevant documents. The 
overall strategy and purpose of this software can provide quick indications and warnings 
of the competitors next move based on thousands of open-source news, reports, and 
documents. The overload of human cognitive labor and time in finding, researching, and 
analyzing data is minimized.  
6. Big Data: Cloud Services and the Semiconductor Industry 
Maintaining a competitive edge with AI technology increasingly depends on 
computer chips and semiconductor resources. The buzz terms “Big Data” and “the cloud” 
are phrases that encompass both the memory capacity to store terabytes, and massive 
amounts, of data in one network infrastructure (not multiple storage networks). The keys 
to high-performance AI computing are semiconductors, made of silicon and germanium, 
                                                 
225 “Primer.Ai,” accessed March 14, 2020, https://primer.ai/. 
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and Graphical Processing Units (GPU), for data storage and to not overload a system to the 
point of disruption or freezing. Although rarely found in nature, silicon can be found in 
silicate or oxide minerals like quartz (looks like a crystal) and is the second most-abundant 
element on Earth following oxygen. Germanium is a lustrous, gray-white, brittle metalloid. 
According to Statistia, since 2019, the top three countries that produce silicon in million 
metric ton are China with 4.5 million metric tons, Russia with 600 million metric tons, 
Norway with 370 million metric tons, and the United States in fourth with 320 million 
metric tons.226 These are the two critical elements necessary to maintain a competitive 
advantage. AI companies have been able to build websites or platforms online and be 
competitive based on data quality, data quantity, and accessibility, whether the data is real 
or synthetic. Russia, a great power competitor, is in the running with silicon production, 
but this discussion goes beyond the scope of this thesis.  
Synthetic data can be used for simulations. naval ISR aircraft all collecting data at 
sea does nothing if one’s goal is to conduct FONOPS in the vicinity of the disputed islands 
of the South China Sea. Some AI applications use synthetic data, which are real data, or 
based on real historical data, and synthetic, or fake, data used for simulations.227 A person 
who trains and writes machine learning algorithms is computationally intensive, but high-
performance computing is necessary to maintain a competitive edge over the adversary. 
Today’s intelligence databases or cloud services storing Big Data are outdated, but 
the new Machine-Assisted Analysis Rapid-Repository System (MARS) may be a good 
initial adoption of cloud services. The current 20-year old intelligence database called 
Modernized Intelligence Database (MIDB) stores data globally for the defense intelligence 
organization, but with the proliferation of data and sensors, today makes MIDB insufficient 
and unreliable. MARS was developed for storage, cloud computing, and machine learning 
AI applications that will allow human operators to use a system capable of ingesting and 
                                                 
226 M. Garside, “Major Countries in Silicon Production from 2014 to 2019 (in 1,000 Metric Tons)*,” 
Statista, February 12, 2020, https://www.statista.com/statistics/268108/world-silicon-production-by-
country/. 
227 AlphaGo in 2015 used historical data from human and human go matches; AlphaGo Zero in 2017 
data was entirely trained with synthetic data from matches AI played against itself. Synthetic data can be 
viable for wargame or peace game scenarios, but is not viable for all AI applications. 
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managing massive amounts of data and possibly simulate courses of action quickly for 
operators.228 
7. Naval Special Warfare Adopts AI for Naval ISR 
NSW and SOCOM combined continue to adopt AI in innovative ways and are true 
early adopters. For example, on February 20, 2020, NSW contracted the company Aery 
Aviation, LLC (“Aery”) to provide air-to-ground ISR services in Full Motion Video 
(FMV), specialized sensors, and communications equipment with a C-208 reconnaissance 
aircraft.229 This new contract and capability encompass training and research and 
development exercise. The previous DOD and Google AI called Project Maven, formerly 
known as Algorithmic Warfare Cross-Functional Team, helps identify missiles in images 
or crowds through a process of “trial and error by the computer as it ingests and processes 
huge amounts of data.”230 While this project may have received ethical or privacy rights 
isuses, unmanned systems remain and innovative methodology to discriminate between the 
population and objectives between civilians and the military, which supports a doctrine set 
by the Geneva Convention (AP1).231 AI programmed into automation systems makes it 
easier to conceive of patterns of hostile or combatant behavior is occurring and thus, 
provide both early warning and review battlespace decisions. 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) are attractive units for rapid fielding and 
prototyping of automation and AI and re-structuring doctrine. According to American 
political scientist and counselor to the United States Department of State (2007-2009) Eliot 
Cohen, elite units can serve as laboratories or incubators for the broader force while 
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providing “fresh thinking into the mainstream of military thought”232 and to shape a more 
efficient AI doctrine. In the book Special Ops by former Navy SEAL and former head of 
USSOCOM Admiral William McRaven, SOF defies conventional wisdom and via 
constant repitition in training and rehearsals, is the key link in achieving a simple mission 
in planning phase with the elements of surprise and speed in the execution phase.233 Thus, 
special operations and elite units identify, utilize, and report deficiencies among each group 
of innovators along the S-Curve when tasked with specific problems and specific 
objectives. 
8. Private, Public, and Commercial Way of Adopting Automation 
and AI 
While China may produce the world’s largest amount of silicon in the world, 
American private and commercial custom-designed chips and GPU innovations derive 
from American companies in further advancing memory capacity on a computer. For 
example, Google’s AI chip is called Tensor Processing Unit (TPU), which can offer 
superior performance in AI computing over GPUs for AI software. While a company called 
NVIDIA designs most GPUs in the United States and manufactured by TSMC in Taiwan, 
acquiring semiconductor design in conjunction with custom-design chips may be the next 
move in Big Data and cloud computing to stay ahead of the AI game.234  
Industry exemplifies staying ahead of the AI game in a tiered system to fit the needs 
of the people in teams and the development cycle before deployment. For example, in June 
2019, Booz Allen Hamilton, an American management and information technology 
consulting firm, hosted a HACKtheMACHINE digital experience event to help the Navy 
solve a critical future issue, which is seeking vulnerabilities and the ability to hack a ship’s 
system.235 Some examples of cyber challenges and opportunities given to academic or 
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industry teams are listed in Table 6 who were able to achieve these AI challenges with AI 
applications such as SharkWire; hacking only within the cyber bubble of this private event. 
Table 6. Capture the Flag: Hack a Newly Developed Cyber Defense for 
Industrial Control Systems 
Low Threat Medium Threat High Threat 
Take Advantage of the ship’s 
position 
Spoof a waypoint that causes the 
auto-pilot system to change 
course 
Simultaneously move the rudder, 
spoof the heading, and change 
GPS coordinates 
Crack the ship’s WEP and WPA2 
Wifi Passwords 
Remotely access websites for 
Human-Machine-Interface 
(HMI) virtually or send fake 
distress signals over VHF Radio 
Create a fake catostrophic 
weather event over the wire to 
cause the ship to change course 
 
If an individual can conduct a cyber attack, these opportunities and challenges pose 
serious threats to naval ISR systems and platforms demand red-teaming by any team 
worldwide to test naval systems, if given the opportunity or challenge in a series of events. 
According to Dr. John Arquilla, 
Unless there is a willingness to try innovative recruitment methods for 
seeking out those with the necessary talents…One creative way to proceed 
with recruiting would be to convince skilled IT industry techs to join up and 
click for their country. This need not be a typical recruitment requiring 
several years of active duty. Instead, the focus could be on bringing talented 
men and women into Reserve and Guard formations, perhaps even forming 
up new, purpose-built cyber units. These could be sited strategically, near 
IT hubs.236 
Setting up quarterly AI challenges to find the fittest AI talent and recruit “cyber 
sentries” from U.S. Reserve units to protect naval networks and systems can help make 
great strides toward adopting automation and AI and avoid the saturation point.237 
The decentralized top DOD organizations that adopt AI may not be as connected, 
posing gaps and weaknesses. Top organizations include the Defense Innovation Unit 
(DIU), DARPA, SOFWERX, JAIC, NavalX. DIU is a DOD organization that contracts 
                                                 




with commercial companies to solve national security problems and located in Silicon 
Valley.238 DARPA invests over $2 billion in new and existing AI programs in their “AI 
Next” campaign with more than five decades of research and development in automation 
in which systems can acquire new knowledge through algorithms.239 SOFWERX is a 
public-private military entity located in Tampa, Florida that combines DEFENSEWERX 
and the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to fuse academia, 
civilian companies, and other non-traditional DOD partners.240  
Specifically, the process of measuring the adoption of AI for naval ISR or for naval 
automation writ large remains unclear. In February 2019, another organization called 
NavalX, was solely designed for the Department of the Navy as a “super connector.” 
NavalX creates social Tech Bridges between start-ups, academia, commercial, public and 
private companies.241 Another major AI center called JAIC, which is designed to harness 
AI, likely faces significant challenging shortfalls as an organization trying to coordinate all 
AI efforts. The plethora of options to adopt AI without a central strategy and design can 
produce gaps and missed opportunities for adopting algorithms and connecting the right 
people to the right organization. NavalX may consider partnering with Match.com to 
quickly connect human operator and systems needs in a user-friendly and rapid way to 
become aware of specific companies like a baseball card or swiping mechanism. 
9. Neural Networks and Deep Learning: Heat Maps, Trees and, 
GANs 
Coherent change detection algorithms for terrain mapping are “hot commodities” 
that use machine learning and neural network techniques to determine a pattern or 
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anomalies. Raytheon has developed Intersect Sentry to detect change and generates heat 
maps to determine change detection, tracking, and averting adversarial activity (Figure 18).  
 
Figure 18. Algorithms in Intersect Sentry Detects and Visualizes Routes of 
Maritime Vessels 
The significance of a heat map is that the algorithm can calculate the probability 
distribution to determine course, speed, and distance to determine patterns or anomalies. 
Heat maps help with detecting multi-dimensional anomalies and situational awareness. 
Some useful open-source websites with this capability include: Global Data on Events, 
Location and Tone (GDELT), satellite imagery, AIS data, and more.242 To fuse all the 
data, the tree diagram is one useful AI technique to categorize and visualize maps. 
Tree diagrams form alternative ways to determine the top two teams, instead, the 
algorithm creates multiple teams and categorizes them per color along the light spectrum. 
To create the heat map, a computer program first divides the area or target of interest into 
smaller parts, then the frequency of unique vessels in each part is color-coded, and lastly, 
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the density in traffic of vessels is calculated based on the number of vessels per unit area 
(Figure 19).243  
 
Figure 19. Heatmap and Trees Indicate Variables and Clustering of Colors244  
A strategy for rapidly training and prototyping machine learning is to integrate 
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) into AI platforms for naval ISR. According to 
Ian Goodfellow, Yoshua Bengio, a researcher in machine learning and deep learning, 
proposed GANs, which is a new framework for estimating generative models through an 
adversarial process. To illustrate possible anomalies, this algorithmic technique helps 
detect, classify, and discriminate the input attributes. Examples of anomalies include false 
positive or false negative objects or vessels produced by sensors onboard ISR platforms.  
China’s fleet is growing and modernizing rapidly to the U.S. Navy with its strategy 
of late adoption and late modernization, but the U.S. Navy still deploys a larger, heavily 
armed, and greater military force. According to the Office of Naval Intelligence, in the last 
two decades, PLAN has been on track to increase its naval capability by 2020 and AI is 
helping its fleet reach its goals to surpass both the U.S. Navy.245 
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V. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 INTRODUCTION 
In this thesis, I have attempted to compare the different ways in which the American 
and Chinese navies have adopted automation and AI for naval ISR. I conceptualized how 
specific automation tools—Aegis, SSDS, and Type-346—improve the modern maritime 
battlespace. Chapter II conceptualizes the term automation—a technique, process, or 
system by which a machine achieves a specific goal— and AI, a more ambitious concept 
that posits analytic and assessment capabilities. Chapter III describes Rogers’ S-Curve of 
technological adoption and suggests a total of five categories of adopters to standardize the 
usage of adopter categories. This methodology is important because, without it, matching 
ideas discussing and categorizing appropriate technologies to its appropriate timeline is 
critical in the adoption process. Chapter IV displays and analyzes ways in which both 
navies have adopted automation and AI naval ISR platforms and software. Although the 
U.S. Navy has maintained dominance in maritime superiority and air superiority, the PLAN 
is fast-approaching in dominating AI for future sea power. 
This thesis contains a seven-step strategy and design process applicable to simple, 
complex, and extraordinarily complex automation or AI applications for technological 
adoption. This theoretical process can help identify primary demands and material 
necessary for successful naval ISR practices in the maritime battlespace. Human beings, 
the material, and physical space represent key elements. The theoretical framework in this 
study identified five key technological adoption capabilities: early and quarterly “campfire 
talks”; visionary and thought leaders; a grand strategic narrative; a design an AI 
development plan; lead in computer technology material resources; and, build an 
instantaneous and user-friendly platform for AI engineering experts and naval knowledge 
experts.  
This chapter covers the summary of findings, the AI gap, ethics and AI, 
recommendations for the U.S. Navy, and future work for automation and AI tools that 
involve human-machine teaming for naval ISR. 
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 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Frank Barnaby reminds us that “military technology is automating warfare.”246 
Current trends show undoubtedly automated processing, fusion, and product delivery for 
command and control the maritime battlespace.247 I began this investigation into 
automation and AI as applied to naval ISR to better understand the adoption mechanisms 
and categories used by both navies that not only make each navy a great competitor but 
also what characteristics and technologies make their forces successful naval AI powers.  
The findings from the S-Curve of technological adoption for naval ISR could be 
important if a commander becomes inundated with information or intelligence and can, 
instead, stimulate a new culture to adopt a hybrid way of adopting automation and AI that 
folds in early adopters with later adopters. According to former CEO of Google Eric 
Schmidt, “The DOD has an innovation adoption problem” and should adopt a DevOps, or 
Development Ops, culture for software systems and focused on “customer adoption.”248 
Cultural development centers on the user or tactical operators and AI engineers that serve 
in both navies. For example, the PLAN has a development culture of adopting technologies 
later. Later adopters or laggards can benefit from early innovators’ successes and failures 
because this category of adopters focuses on adopting and “copy-catting” successful 
technologies and has observed what technological failures not to adopt.  
Figure 20 demonstrates that both navies as near-peer competitors and are successful 
at adopting automation; however, they are on opposite ends of the curve. This means that 
                                                 
246 Barnaby, The Automated Battlefield, 21. 
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the U.S. Navy represents innovation and early adoption, and PLAN represents later 
majority and laggards of adopting technologies for naval ISR missions.  
 
Figure 20. U.S. Navy Innovators and Adopters Compared to PLAN Later 
Adopters Along the Logistic S-Curve 
Both great power competitors appear to co-exist and complete the wavelength within a 
forward or backward thinking way of adopting technologies, but the political system can 
impact the rate of adoption whether it is by an innovator or later adopter. 
1. AI Benefits an Autocratic Navy 
The rate at which automation and AI technologies are adopted tends to benefit an 
autocratic society. According to CCP’s AI strategy, China’s plan is to become the global 
innovation center by rapidly developing AI, reinforcing China’s lead in adopting 
automation for naval ISR.249 China’s population is over 1.4 billion citizens, with 
approximately 290,000 PLAN personnel, which roughly equates to 12.6 percent of PLA’s 
2.3 million personnel. Since 2018, China has led the world in publishing approximately 
42.64 percent of top AI papers, approximately 52 percent of AI global patents, and places 
second in AI companies with over 1,011 companies compared to the 2,028 of U.S. AI 
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companies.250 The authoritarian system creates an environment that values security over 
privacy for China’s massive population because the government and AI companies are 
ultimately controlled by the Chinese Communist Party. In the private sector, China 
leverages Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent (collectively referred to as BAT) for fueling the 
growth of AI with fewer privacy restrictions compared to the West. China has the 
advantage of a higher population in an open society to assist with cleaning data, to develop 
or copy algorithms, and to collect and surveil naval platforms at sea with open-source data 
and social media. Perhaps, the powerful feedback loop between corporations developing 
AI and the CCP is a marriage made in heaven for PLAN; alternatively, this is a match made 
in hell for the U.S. Navy.251  
2. Automation and AI: Changes in International Maritime 
Governance 
PLAN has since been able to take advantage of and lay claim to a new model of 
maritime governance and is rapidly approaching its dominance in AI. China has already 
begun to overtake the U.S. Navy in adopting automation. In China’s Tsinghua University’s 
recent work on AI development, stage five (2017 to present) of China’s national AI policy 
evolution shows the characteristics of next-generation AI among the military, industry, and 
the civilian sector.252 Since 2013, PLAN and China built and militarized its self-made 
islands (i.e. Fiery Cross, Subi Reef, Mischief Reef) in SCS with cruise missiles and air 
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defense systems.253 Within the first island chain, the PLAN has the “home-court” 
advantage to surveil and maintain its 12-nautical-mile zone around the disputed islands in 
the SCS. PLAN continues to use Dongdiao-class AGI spy ships to learn about U.S. naval 
affairs. As later adopters, the PLAN will likely be able to “copy-cat” successful naval ISR 
tactics and operations demonstrated by the U.S. Navy. 
The PLAN is taking the lead in AI over the U.S. Navy with its spy ships, 
reconnaissance satellites, and OTH radars by collecting massive amounts of data. Moore’s 
Law, where the number of transistors per silicon chip—computing processing—power 
doubles every two years, leads to rapid growth and productivity.254 The PLAN is taking 
advantage of collecting massive data from sea to space assets to produce high quality data. 
If computer processing doubles every two years, it will be less challenging to filter through 
with high-quality data collected over time and easier to locate in a central data storage (i.e., 
the cloud).  
As the PLAN continues to build more network infrastructure locally and globally, 
it shows its willingness to take short-term risks for long-term advantages. Another long-
accepted factor, Metcalfe’s Law, asserts that the value growth of the fully connected 
network is proportional to the square of the number of compatibly communicating 
devices.255 For example, if a network has five nodes fully interconnected with each other, 
the inherent value of each being x, its power is 100x (due to its ten distinct links) versus 
the 5x power of a single-linked network. While the value of the networks increases for 
compatible communication, it also increases cybersecurity issues if a competitor disrupts 
or hacks one of those nodes. The PLAN’s is willing to take the risk of computer network 
attacks to dominate in AI for long-term strategy. 
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3. U.S. Navy’s First Mover Advantage: Semiconductors and 
Software 
However, the U.S. leadership in AI already extends beyond the U.S. littorals, has 
more naval personnel than the PLAN, and leads material resources necessary to build 
network infrastructures. While the U.S. population is 329.4 million,256 lower than China’s 
overall population, the U.S. Navy has 339,448 personnel, which is more than the number 
of personnel in the PLAN.257 The U.S. Navy has the first-mover advantage to adopt AI 
technologies not simply because it has more people than the PLAN, but because the United 
States leads in top AI companies. Specifically, U.S. AI companies focus on enterprise 
software, semiconductors, and quantum computing. 
However, the marriage between the U.S. Navy and industry or private companies 
can present significant issues and friction with AI engineers who do not or do not 
consistently support the military with AI. Great American talent derives from Silicon 
Valley, the Joint AI Center, DOD’s programs such as DARPA, DIU, and NavalX. 
However, the top AI companies such as Google, Facebook, and Amazon have received 
criticism for privacy rights issues and public opinion of the weaponization of AI creates 
issues of seamless collaboration. Even though the U.S. Navy and the DOD appear to lead 
in some aspects of AI when collaborating with Silicon Valley to prototype and field 
commercial AI tools within 60 to 90 days,258 this does not apply to all naval ISR platforms. 
USSOCOM may be able to take advantage of commercial AI tools with Silicon Valley-
based AI engineers, but conventional U.S. Navy may likely years or decades to fully 
automate and adopt AI tools with legacy, conventional platforms. 
                                                 
256 “U.S. and World Population Clock,” United States Census Bureau, April 3, 2020, 
https://www.census.gov/popclock/. 
257 “Status of the Navy,” U.S. Navy, April 3, 2020, https://www.navy.mil/navydata/
nav_legacy.asp?id=146. 
258 “Defense Innovation Unit: Who We Are/Our Mission,” Defense Innovation Unit, accessed April 
22, 2020, https://www.diu.mil/about. 
99 
4. An Automated Aircraft Carrier May Be Powerless in Future of 
AI and Sea Power 
ISR technologies make it nearly impossible to hide naval platforms, and massive 
amounts of data can deceive the competitor. In his article, “Artificial Intelligence on the 
Battlefield,” Dr. Zachary Davis, a Senior Fellow at Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory and Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, believes, “AI could erode 
stability by increasing the perceived risk of a surprise attack,” and AI-supported ISR 
platforms on one side can confuse other exquisite ISR.259 With many naval ISR operators 
working long hours and unable to fully vet the relevancy and accuracy of locating mobile 
targets, and also strike with speed and precision, Davis claims ISR operators today are 
easily victimized by the massive amounts of data and the over-collection of data with which 
the competitor is all too eager to manipulate or deceive the other competitor. 
 THE AI GAP: MISSING AI PLATFORM TO CONNECT AI ENGINEERS 
AND OPERATORS/USERS 
This study reveals that there is no apparent central automation or AI tool with 
instantaneous notification techniques connecting the AI engineer to the knowledge expert 
or naval user to fix issues faster.260 Bridging the gap automatically can significantly help 
gain customer and competitor insights. According to a RAND study on assessing data 
analytics, a particular challenge is associated with the collection and use of unstructured 
data, and not in fixed locations such as a relational database.261 Automating an AI platform 
for AI engineers and naval users directly and within one central database is vital for the 
U.S. Navy to resolve and master. Adopting a new platform to connect AI builders and naval 
users will help surpass the inflection point of technological adoption. 
                                                 
259 Zachary S. Davis, Artificial Intelligence on the Battlefield: An Initial Survey of Potential 
Implications for Deterrence Stability and Strategic Surprise (Livermore, CA: Center for Global Security 
Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 2019), 14–16, https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/
docs/CGSR-AI_BattlefieldWEB.pdf. 
260 Refer to Chapter 1, pages 6–7 regarding Stanford University Professor Feigenbaum’s “Expert 
System.” 
261 Philip S. Anton et al., Assessing the Use of Data Analytics in Department of Defense Acquisition 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB10085.html. 
100 
Despite the increased collection of information, this study reveals that descriptive 
and diagnostic styles, specifically visual analytics and trend analysis, are utilized. AI 
provides information about what has happened in naval ISR (i.e., platforms and sensors) 
and diagnostic AI pinpoints the exact problem or issues quickly. As mentioned in Chapter 
IV, the U.S. Navy adopted an OTH visual analytical tool for early warning of incoming 
naval platforms. Descriptive Both descriptive and diagnostic styles of AI are fundamental 
processes to master prior to adopting more complex predictive and prescriptive AI, typified 
by neural networks, pattern recognition, machine learning, and deep learning. 
Predictive AI is lacking in the U.S. Navy’s arsenal of data analytics. Predictive AI 
provides data as to what will likely happen—where a naval platform may go next or 
possibly why it is going to specific locations next. Examples of predictive AI techniques 
are machine learning, pattern recognition, and statistical modeling; this approach to AI 
programming uses historic and statistical data to conduct trend analysis of naval activities. 
Predictive and prescriptive AI are advanced techniques necessary to maintain a competitive 
posture toward China. 
Prescriptive AI is also lacking. Prescriptive AI provides data on what will happen 
and what could happen better if naval ISR platforms conduct x, y, or z maneuvers at sea, 
based on historic data, and provide recommendations. Examples of prescriptive AI include 
supervised learning algorithms such as “random forest,” which creates and merges decision 
trees into one “forest” based on previously collected data or models. This can help support 
future heat mapping and Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) techniques for war-
gaming or “red-teaming” against competitors like the PLAN. Simply put, whether the 
navies adopt early or after all other navies have adopted specific automation or AI 
technologies, perfecting the basics and developing a culture of innovation and AI 
operations at each level of command remains critical to the success of leading in AI. 
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Another AI platform the U.S. Navy lacks is one that distinguishes possible 
abnormalities or anomalies from “normal” patterns of life at sea.262 To develop and adopt 
technologies to distinguish abnormalities or anomalies at sea, the currently available 
material, such as semiconductors and software talent from Silicon Valley, should be 
accessed and tested consistently and frequently. Issues of software or hardware deficiency 
can lead to latency in updating, which may ultimately pose issues in identifying and 
locating PLAN forces operating at sea.  
The commercialization of AI and military technologies can be the next game-
changing threat.263 Drones sold and used by the commercial industry can lead to the 
competitor using swarm tactics against critical sensors such as Aegis, SSDS, or Dragon 
Eye radars. Each level of automation and AI adds a layer of complexity to diagnose, 
predict, and prescribe the next move by the PLAN. Moreover, if PLAN develops AI with 
the commercial sector, it creates less control by the U.S. Navy over the specific software 
or hardware updates. Less control over specific automation or AI tools can lead to other 
competitors or adversaries buying, selling, and adopting the tools and using them directly 
against the U.S. Navy.  
 RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study provides four major recommendations. First, the U.S. Navy should 
develop a popular platform for direct feedback and change the culture to streamline the 
connection between AI engineers and tactical operators, like Amazon’s instant feedback 
loop. Another exemplary community that is already adopting emerging technologies 
quickly is the Special Operations Force (SOF), specifically Special Operations Command 
                                                 
262 Pattern of life software exists to analyze large amounts of data from many different sensors 
represented on a Common Operational Picture or large graphs to find distinct behavior patterns that may 
indicate a deviation from normal modes of operation, malintent, or anomalous patterns. Any deviation from 
expected pattern sends immediate “red flags” that can tremendously help understand the competitors 
normal or abnormal behavior, help prevent collisions, and proactively prepare appropriate and professional 
responses 
263 Zachary Davis, Michael Nacht, and Ronald Lehman, eds., Strategic Latency and World Power: 
How Technology Is Changing Our Concepts of Security (Livermore, CA: Center for Global Security 
Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 2014), 11, https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/
Strategic_Latency.pdf. 
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(USSOCOM). DOD organizations such as DIU, NavalX, and USSOCOM can give, 
according to NPS Professor Leo Blanken, “a simple and cost-effective way to improve 
existing innovation efforts in the field: aligning military graduate researchers with 
deployed special operations units to rapidly prototype. concepts and technologies.”264 The 
SOF community provides an attractive testbed for rapid prototyping and instantly connect 
tactical users to AI engineers. 
Second, the U.S. Navy should invest in and adopt a “DevOps” culture to maintain 
a competitive advantage over the PLAN. In a hierarchical organization, cultivating and 
practicing DevOps will inherently start with an AI school or time for education in the pre- 
and post-deployment cycle. This can only be indoctrinated and inspired by senior officers 
in charge. Arguably, the U.S. continues to lead in innovation and software technology and 
talent but can further improve by co-locating U.S. naval commands or headquarters nearby 
commercial and private AI companies to cultivate and adopt the next AI breakthrough.  
Third, while implanting more automation and AI into the aircraft carrier, the 
corresponding doctrine should consider swarm tactics and cyberspace. Just like hives of 
bees can swarm a bear and overtake him, the autonomous drones can easily swarm a carrier 
strike group, particularly Aegis or SSDS and its associated antennas.265 The consequence 
of not incorporating swarm technologies with operational and tactical ISR missions can 
lead to the competitor destroying Aegis or Type-346 with very little cost and tremendous 
damage to naval ISR.  
Fourth, both navies share cyberspace. JP 3-12 defines information dominance as 
“the degree of dominance in cyberspace by one force that permits the secure, reliable 
conduct of operations by that force, and its related land, air, maritime, and space forces at 
a given time and place without prohibitive interference by an adversary.”266 Cyberspace 
                                                 
264 Leo Blanken, Philip Swintek, and Justin Davis, “Special Operations as an Innovation Laboratory,” 
War on the Rocks, February 25, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/02/special-operations-as-an-
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265 John Arquilla, In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age (Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND Corporation, 1997), 465. 
266 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Cyberspace Operations, Joint Pub 3–12 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, 2018), GL-4, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_12.pdf. 
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is the Achilles heel of automated naval platforms because automation and communication 
between naval ISR platforms rely on sharing the information space and deconflicting 
frequencies to communicate. 
In this thesis, I discovered five points that should be considered when adopting 
automation and AI for naval ISR: 
1. Develop a strategic narrative from day one and discuss the AI strategy at 
each level of command. A strategic narrative is a special kind of story that 
an organization can clearly understand and engage with the story. This is 
important because it tells other maritime competitors who you are, where 
you have been, where you are going, and where you are. Each command 
should want to inspire its military service members, excite allies and 
partners, and attract users such as the AI engineer(s) and human operators. 
2. The country and navy that has control of the technological materials 
necessary to build automation and AI, such as semiconductors, silicon, 
and germanium, will dominate in AI in future sea power. Is the market 
ready to support the military’s solutions in naval ISR? 
3. Success or failure of adoption of automation relies significantly, if not 
entirely, on the control of the electromagnetic spectrum and ability to 
deconflict frequencies. 
4. There should be an automated AI feedback platform so that military users 
and AI engineers can text and speak directly. A winning and better end-to-
end product requires great user experience for efficient workflow and 
instantaneous reporting. 
5. The significant insight between early adopters and laggards shows that the 
U.S. Navy and PLAN are on opposite ends of the wavelength of 
technological adoption and competition. In Rogers’ work on the S-Curve 
of technological adoption in Chapter III, both American and Chinese naval 
leaders falling on opposite ends of the S-Curve suits each of their 
organizational and doctrinal structures.  
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 THE FUTURE OF SEA POWER AND FUTURE WORK: HUMAN-
MACHINE TEAMING 
Humans and machines teaming together is the key to the adoption of automation 
and AI in naval ISR affairs. This section covers future work and long-term considerations 
in the adoption process of automation and AI. These factors are: automate health indicators 
for the operator; take advantage of research in quantum computing; and, the increase of 
various reality technologies (virtual, augmented, and mixed). 
1. Team AI Health: COVID-19 
The center of gravity for Naval ISR and adopting automation or emerging 
technologies depends on healthy human operators on naval platforms to operate the 
systems. If an epidemic disease spreads throughout one aircraft carrier such as USS 
Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71), then all ISR in support of carrier operations halts and the 
U.S. Navy fails to adopt AI for surveillance—with consequences that could lead to life or 
death situations.267 AI can provide significant human-assisted tools that can automate clear 
indicators.  
Commanders will find it useful to strategize various designs and design a strategy 
to integrate health practices and AI for naval operators. An automated stop-light chart and 
daily tracker with notification symbols that blink, or flash will help indicate a diagnosed 
problem or trigger for commanders and decision-makers. A simple model to automate 
indicators related to biological event-related social disruption is the Wilson-Collman Scale 
of four stages of the increased likelihood of a biological event: favorable conditions, 
unifocal or multifocal biological events, severe infrastructure constraint, and depletion of 
local response capacity, and then social collapse.268 A second complex model is Johns 
                                                 
267 Lucy Craymer, “Virus Grounds a U.S. Aircraft Carrier as Crew Quarantined in Guam,” Wall 
Street Journal, April 1, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/virus-grounds-a-u-s-aircraft-carrier-as-crew-
quarantined-in-guam-11585736476. 
268 See James M. Wilson et al., “A Heuristic Indication and Warning Staging Model for Detection and 
Assessment of Biological Events,” Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association 15, no. 2 
(April 2008): 158–71, https://doi.org/10.1197/jamia.M2558 can be used to “determine the level of concern 
warranted, such as whether the pathogen in question is responding to established public health disease 
control measures, including the use of antimicrobials or vaccines; whether the public health and medical 
infrastructure of the country involved is adequate to mount the necessary response.” . 
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Hopkins Coronavirus interactive map.269 Another database to extract or utilize models 
from is Cornell University’s arXiv database for top AI researchers in the world 
submitting to Stanford University’s prominent repository (see the appendix).270 
Automating lists of SWOT in an interactive way can benefit naval ISR. This is important 
because having a clear defined list of tasks and problems helps diagnose problems as 
early as possible and finding the right AI researchers quickly. 
2. Quantum Computing
Further research into quantum computing will contribute to the U.S. Navy’s 
successful adoption of AI. Quantum computing goes beyond binary digits (bit value of 
either 0 or 1), which is the smallest unit of data in a computer, and uses what researcher 
Thomas Campbell calls “qubits, in which an individual bit can be in one of three states: on, 
off, and, uniquely, both on and off simultaneously.”271 In the U.S. National Quantum 
Initiative of 2018, Congress identified the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) and the Department of Energy’s Quantum Information Science Research Centers 
as top leading departments for quantum computing. Thus, the U.S. Navy should 
continuously collaborate with NIST and DOE closely.272 In this case, Congress is one of 
the top keys in financing and putting forth bills to initiate the adoption of emerging 
technologies within the Navy. While in its infant stages, quantum computing can increase 
AI speed, particularly in machine learning, in order to spot patterns rapidly and filter 
through massive datasets; it will cast the long shadows of future sea power. 
269 See Johns Hopkins University, “COVID-19 Dashboard by the Center for Systems Science and 
Engineering (CSSE) at Johns Hopkins University (JHU),” Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center, 
accessed May 26, 2020, https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html. 
270 arXiv, “Artificial Intelligence,” accessed September 11, 2019, https://arxiv.org/list/cs.AI/recent. 
271 Thomas A. Campbell, Artificial Intelligence: An Overview of State Initiatives (Evergreen, CO: 
FutureGrasp, LLC, 2019), 11, http://www.unicri.it/in_focus/files/Report_AI-
An_Overview_of_State_Initiatives_FutureGrasp_7-23-19.pdf. 
272 National Quantum Initiative Act, Pub. L. No. 115–368, 132 Stat. 5092 (2018), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/6227. 
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3. Ethics and AI 
The United States and China have both released “principles” rather than focusing 
on the controversial issue of whether automation and AI are ethical, morally permissible, 
or not morally permissible. In June 2019, China’s Ministry of Science and Technology 
published the “Governance Principles for a New Generation of Artificial Intelligence: 
Develop Responsible Artificial Intelligence,” which lists eight principles of AI 
governance: (1) harmony and friendliness; (2) fairness and justice; (3) inclusiveness and 
sharing; (4) respect for privacy; (5) security and controllability; (6) shared responsibility; 
(7) open cooperation; (8) agile governance. In February 2020, the DOD’s Defense 
Innovation Unit spent 15 months prior to announcing its adoption of five principles of AI 
ethics: They should be Responsible, Reliable, Equitable, Governable, Traceable.273 
Releasing principles like the ethical AI guidance suggests that both nations desire 
flexibility, but also responsibility in the development of AI. With or without principles, 
major controversies over the use of AI quickly become relevant to issues on AI 
misidentification and the possibility of weaponizing automation and AI tools. 
First, ethical issues exist related to AI and the military that have been portrayed 
both in the movies, such as Terminator or I, Robot, which began as thoughtful short stories 
by Isaac Asimov,274 and demonstrated in real-life situations. Some argue that military 
technology or the use of AI in the military should not continue, due to the possibility that 
computer systems could act on their own accord or make their own lethal decision based 
on popular movies and social media. If AI tells a human operator that an aircraft is hostile, 
only seconds exist for the Commander to decide to respond or not respond based on the 
information available. However, since 1988, the adoption of automation and AI engineered 
in ISR platforms has increased transparency and avoided incidents like USS Vincennes, 
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which was a human error and not a machine error.275 Arguably, automation helps for 
defense against friendly or enemy fires and for national security. 
Second, in human-machine teaming, humans are moral agents and machines are 
not, but can be built to provide ethical choices. In Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, a 
virtuous person does not hold an openly virtuous attitude but, rather, is one who acts in 
certain ways in specific situations, with a range of reasons. Humans can consciously make 
separate choices; whereas machines today simply assist human beings in making decisions. 
In the U.S. Navy, ethical matters likely depend on a traditionalist or legalist perspective, or 
possibly a revisionist view of an idea with a more inquisitive or possibly utilitarian 
mindset.276  
In the PLAN, future work on ethics and the adoption of automation can be studied 
through the ethical decisions made by the PRC and CCP. In China, ethics relate closely to 
virtue ethics, concerning how one ought to live, and consequentialism, concerning the 
benefit of all involving material goods.277  
While AI machines today are autonomous to a certain extent, AI machines could 
eventually present consequences based on specified moral ethical codes quicker than a 
human can think about them. Two serious ethical issues are: can autonomous systems be, 
or will they be categorized as moral agents in the future? What happens when there is a 
lack of accountability regarding amoral agents—autonomous systems—that violate human 
laws of war in life or death situations?278 These ethical questions posed by NPS Professor 
Bradley Strawser are worth considering, but go beyond the scope of this thesis.  
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4. Human-Machine Teaming and Virtual Reality (Augmented 
Reality) 
While I share great enthusiasm for automation and AI’s potential to greatly improve 
human wellbeing, the development of machines with intelligence superior to humans could 
cause cognitive dissonance within the mind of a human operator and possibly be used as a 
deterrent mechanism.279 Albert Einstein warned the power of the atom could change our 
modes of thinking. The atomic bomb led to the nuclear catastrophes of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. Then nuclear power turned into the idea of a “nuclear Armageddon,” which is a 
theoretical scenario involving the use of nuclear weapons to cause widespread destruction 
and eventually, the collapse of civilization. Today, former Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger, among many others, believes AI threatens our consciousness and our way of 
understanding truth and reality.280 The notion that AI can be used as a deterrence tool is 
an important question that can be further studied in future research. 
Based on this study, the more automated the naval ISR platforms and the increase 
of AI tools, the more virtual naval affairs and sea power will become. Recent reports like 
the U.S. “Extended Reality Applications in U.S. Defense Training, 2020” shed light on the 
daily impact of digital transformation on human beings and has extended to Virtual Reality 
(VR), Augmented Reality (AR), and Mixed Reality (MR) technologies that could be the 
next disruptive technologies. The commercialization of various forms of VR may become 
a threat against naval forces.281 This study has not addressed reality technologies, VR, AR, 
or MR can be extremely useful to keep human beings safe from harm or as a deterrence 
tool. 
With Einstein’s and Kissinger’s warnings on the catastrophe of a nuclear war and 
AI threatening our human consciousness, respectively, AI could possibly trend toward a 
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“cognition war.” A cognition war would be the use of automation and AI on the maritime 
battlefield, virtually controlled by human beings not physically at sea. As a deterrence tool, 
AI can be used to threaten the competitor with the possible existence of naval threats at sea 
with “fake injected data” when in reality, no machine is present or has been present.  
Humanity is at the edge of information dominance in a revolution driven by 
automation and AI. From ancient times, fleets at sea have sought to know what lay beyond 
the horizon, where the enemy might lurk. A century ago, the rise of radio and radar 
mounted on piloted aircraft gave navies the ability to extend surveillance far beyond 
horizons. Ironically, the ultimate effect of AI solving problems and managing information 
may be the transformation of human reasoning, intelligence, and decision making. Today, 
automation is both extending its reach globally and interpreting the flood of information to 
solve problems and create full transparency more than ever before. Truly, automated ISR 
is changing human knowledge, perception, reality, and, ultimately, the face of 21st Century 
sea power.  
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APPENDIX 
USING AI TOOLS TO FIND AI TALENT 
The acceleration for research and development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) has 
globalized social networks worldwide. AI social networks thrive in research facilities from 
superpower countries like the United States and China can cross-pollinate for research to 
advance research in AI software. Top popular AI emerging technologies topics are 
Machine Learning (ML), Computer Vision (CV) and Pattern Recognition (PR). ML 
enables machines to learn from a task from a previous experience without new 
programming by a human; CV uses AI to detect and identify images; and, PR combines 
the two in which a computer recognizes patterns based on ML and CV results.282 The 
researchers writing AI papers at academic research facilities can be recruited for their 
skills. 
The data is from a repository arena within Cornell University’s arXiv database of 
research submissions worldwide. The purpose is to provide a potential network analysis of 
how AI can be adopted and researched in academia (in terms of computer vision, machine 
learning, pattern recognition, etc.), by who and paper topics. This network is a two-mode 
data set (author to paper). 
The ML, CV, and PR data used in this researched is derived from Cornell 
University’s arXiv website. Cornell’s arXiv is a central database and electronic repository 
for approved scientific papers with over 10,000 submissions per month and not fully peer 
reviewed. research, recognition, and possible funding for future work.283 The benefit of 
such a worldwide, open-source website with AI authors and AI papers is access to trending 
or innovative research. A second benefit is to be able to disrupt their network and directly 
recruit individuals or a pool of people talented and driven in AI research. Relational ties 
and organizations included in this network will encompass the approved papers submitted 
282 “8 Best Topics for Research and Thesis in Artificial Intelligence,” GeeksforGeeks: A Computer 
Science Portal for Geeks, accessed February 20, 2020, https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/8-best-topics-for-
research-and-thesis-in-artificial-intelligence/. 
283 “Artificial Intelligence.” 
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within arXiv database from 2009 to 2019 (Figure 21). The dataset will be bounded by the 
following topics: AI bulk, computer vision and pattern recognition, statistical machine 
learning, and database.  
Figure 21. Cornell University’s ArXiv Researchers: Computer Vision and 
Pattern Recognition: Paper to Person 1,999 Nodes, Density, 
Clustering Coefficient 
Figure 22 represents the group size statistics on the number of groups, isolated groups, 
two per group (dyad), three per group (triad), and larger groups of researchers working 
together. The algorithm in a computer software called ORA, an analytical tool used for 
social network analysis, automatically generates visual representations of interconnected 
nodes from a specific dataset input into the software, which in this case was derived from 
arXiv.284 
284 “ORA,” Center for Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems (CASOS), 
accessed November 11, 2019, http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/index.php. 
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Figure 22. Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition: Density, Clustering 
Coefficient 
The aggregated sociography for CV and is moderately connected network. The 
metrics shows a total of 1,220 groups with 5.4 percent dyad and 11.5 percent triad co-
authorship and 55 percent single authorship, which indicates the majority work 
independently on papers. Figure 23 displays the top 10 actors in the network within 10 
diverse types of groups and his or her value through the Girvan-Newman algorithm. 
 
Figure 23. Girvan-Newman Clustering Group (Nodes with Highest Internal 
Degree) 
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K-core is a “maximal group of actors, all of whom are connected to some number 
(k) of other group members.”285 According to Naval Postgraduate School Professor Sean 
Everton, “Girvan-Newman begins with a connected network and then strategically 
removes ties, a process that partitions the network into an increasing number of 
clusters.”286 The key to this algorithm is the notion of edge betweenness, in which the 
algorithm estimates the ties, or betweenness centrality of the edges. In other words, it 
measures the shortest path between the authors. 
I have pulled this group and searched each of their affiliated schools, organizations, 
and particular fields of research and each of them are from organizations around the world. 
Guillermo Sapiro has over 64,000 citations on Google Scholar and one of his most recent 
studies in 2020 on deep neural networks relates to detecting adversaries using influence 
and nearest neighbors. Group 1 reveals the top 10 authors or nodes and separate from the 
other Girvan-Newman groups. In Table 7, the top 10 AI experts who have written papers 
are shown, including associated schools, organizations, and research topics. 
Table 7. Group 1: Top 10 AI Experts with an Internal Node Count of 158 
 
 
                                                 
285 Sean Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 
182. 
286 Everton, 195. 
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By using ORA combined with researching on Google Scholar, this social network 
analysis algorithm illuminates hidden talent that the DOD and United States Navy can 
leverage to maintain its competitive advantage over other adversaries. In particular, the 
DOD can visualize and seek well-connected authors and co-authors who are researching 
today on deep neural networks that can or will be used in the future for counter-AI tools or 
future work that can be further researched and connected with relevant DOD components. 
Figure 24 shows social network analysis using the software ORA and data set derived from 
arXiv.  
 
Figure 24. K-Core Subgroup of CV and PR 
Figure 25 shows the group statistics and large group statistics of AI researchers 
studying topics on computer vision and pattern recognition. The group statistics helps 
visualize how many groups and how many groups of two, three or more are collaborating. 
 
Figure 25. K-Core Group Size and Large Group Statistics 
116 
 
However, this data set is limited to mostly one author to one author on a research 
paper in which 83 percent of the nodes are tied to one other node. 
 RESULTS: ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC NETWORKS  
In the Machine Learning Group 1, four main nodes were taken out of the whole 
network for further analysis. This group showed the most connections, as depicted in light 
blue, blue, lime green, and gold, as shown in Figure 26. 
 
Figure 26. Top Connected AI and Machine Learning Researchers Derived 
ArXiv and Visualized through ORA 
Guillermo Sapiro (ML, CV; over 64,000 scholarly citations), Yann LeCun (ML, 
CV, image compression; over 140,000 citations), Michael Bronstein (geometric deep 
learning; over 14,000 citations), and Jonathan Masci (AI, ML, CV; over 5,000 citations) 
appear to be the center nodes with the most connections. French mathematician and École 
Normale Supérieure Professor Stephane Mallat (over 100,000 citations) is represented by 
a center gold node and appears to be a potential bridge between Sapiro’s and LeCun’s 
networks, as show in Figure 27. If severed, these two would not be connected any longer. 
However, if one wanted to be connected to both of their networks, ORA’s algorithm has 
revealed Mallat is the “go-to” person regarding this field of research in AI. The farthest in 
117 
distance of connected nodes appears to be Rama Chellappa and her network. Mallat has 
researched heavily on facial and pattern recognition, specifically mathematics on high 
degree approximations and deep convolutional networks for image identification and 
classification (see Figure 27). 
 
Figure 27. Social Network Analysis Shows Stephane Mallat as a Bridge 
Between LeCun’s and Sapiro’s Networks 
In CV and PR, a more well-connected and smaller part of the whole network was 
separated out to visually display a few central nodes. Depicted by the pink arrows, the AI 
authors Zhouchen Lin, Allen Yang, and Yi Ma are limited in centrality, betweenness, 
brokerage potential, clustering coefficient, and so on and so forth. Clearly, this network is 
not very dense. Zhouchen Lin is the Vice President of Samsung Research and works at 
Peking University in China. Allen Y. Yang is a research expertise in the fields of CV, 
robotics, and pattern recognition at Berkeley University as the Chief Scientist, Fung 
Institute for Engineering Leadership and Executive Director for the Center of Augmented 
Cognition. Yi Ma is a Berkeley professor with an expertise in Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
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Control, Intelligent Systems, and Robotics (CIR) Signal Processing (SP) Computer Vision 
Compressive Sensing. These top three nodes show a direct tie between the United States 
and China both heavily researching in AI, but with very low out-degree.  
However, this specific network reveals heavy international connections. For 
instances, Lin is connected to Shuicheng Yan (center left, central node) who is a professor 
at National University of Singapore. Yan is connected to a U.S. Johns Hopkins and 
biomedical engineer Professor Rene Vidal (Figure 28). 
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